The General Warrant of the Twentieth Century? A Fourth Amendment Solution to Unchecked Discretion to Arrest for Traffic Offenses by Salken, Barbara C.
Pace Law Review
Volume 17
Issue 3 Tribute 1997
Celebrating the Life of Barbara C. Salken
Article 16
June 1997
The General Warrant of the Twentieth Century? A
Fourth Amendment Solution to Unchecked
Discretion to Arrest for Traffic Offenses
Barbara C. Salken
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law
Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Barbara C. Salken, The General Warrant of the Twentieth Century? A Fourth Amendment Solution to
Unchecked Discretion to Arrest for Traffic Offenses, 17 Pace L. Rev. 97 (1997)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol17/iss3/16
[Reprinted with Permission from Temple Law
Review, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 221 (1989). Citations
appear as they do in the original.]
The General Warrant of the Twentieth
Century? A Fourth Amendment Solution to
Unchecked Discretion to Arrest
for Traffic Offenses
Barbara C. Salken*
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
I. How the Supreme Court Created the
Unconditional Power to Conduct Far-Reaching
Searches of a Traffic Offender.... .. ... . . . . 102
A. Search Incident to Arrest Exception. . . . 103
B. Search Incident to an Arrest for a Traffic
Violation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 106
1. United States v. Robinson and Gustafson v.
Florida..... . . . 106
2. New York v. Belton 112
II. Perspectives on Robinson. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 116
A. Suppression on a Showing of Pretext . . . . . . . . .. 118
B. Limiting the Scope of Searches Incident to
Arrest for Traffic Offenses .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 126
C. Excluding Evidence Other than Weapons
Found During a Search Incident to a Traffic
Offense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 129
D. Limiting the Power to Arrest for Minor Traffic
Offenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 133
* Associate Professor of Law, Pace University. B.A., Skidmore College, 1969;
J.D., Brooklyn Law School, 1975.
I gratefully acknowledge the thoughtful editorial suggestions of Professors
Bennett L. Gershman, M. Stuart Madden, and Harry I. Subin, as well as the re-
search assistance of Warren Roth and Joseph Poggiolo. I would like to separately
thank me friend, Professor Donald L. Doernberg, whose generous contribution of
time and intellect was truly extraordinary.
97
1
98 PACE LAW REVIEW [Tribute
III. The Case for Constitutional Restrictions on the
Power to Arrest for Traffic Offenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 139
A. The Fourth Amendment was Designed to
Prevent Unlimited and Arbitrary Exercise of
Government Power to Search and Seize 141
1. The Political History Antecedent to the.
Fourth Amendment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 142
2. The Relationship of Searches Following
Traffic Arrests to the Practices that Caused
Enactment of the Fourth Amendment ..... 145
B. Common Law Authority for Arrest for Minor
Offenses..... .. . .. 147
C. A Balance of Individual Privacy Interests and
Governmental Interests Does Not Reasonably
Justify Custodial Arrest for Traffic Offenses . .. 148
1. The Nature of the Intrusion 154
2. The Nature of the Governmental Interests. 158
a. To insure the presence of the suspect at
trial 158
b. To obtain evidence of the crime for
which the suspect is arrested.......... 161
c. To prevent future harm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 162
d. To provide certain social service
functions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 164
e. To maintain the proper respect for the
law and the police..................... 165
3. The Result of the Balance 166
Conclusion 168
Introduction
The fourth amendment! protects against unreasonable
searches and seizures.2 A search is generally considered unrea-
1. u.s. CONST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
2. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 60 (1950); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925).
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sonable unless it is based on probable cause and has been au-
thorized by warrant.3 Given that the intent of the framers of
the amendment was to protect against the unlimited and arbi-
trary exercise of power by the government,4 a layman would
doubtless be surprised to learn that police officers in most states
may arrest and search virtually every adult almost at whim.
This power exists because of the combination of two factors: the
myriad rules regulating automobile travel and the Supreme
Court's refusal to treat searches and seizures arising out ofvio-
lations of traffic laws any differently from searches and seizures
associated With serious criminal offenses.5
When a police officer sees a traffic offense, such as driving
with a faulty turn signal, the officer has the power to direct the
driver to stop the vehicle and produce identification.6 Although
'most would expect the officer to issue a summons, that is not
the only option available. In many jurisdictions the officer may
arrest the driver, which may involve a brief ride to the precinct
followed by the payment of a bond7 or the signing of an agree-
ment to later appear in court.S The arrest may also be as intru-
sive as detention in a jail cell until appearance before a
magistrate.9 But in any case, after arrest, the officer may
search the driver. This is not a mere pat-down search, some-
times called a frisk, which is associated with a search for weap-
3. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971) (search of car ab-
sent prior approval by judge or magistrate is per se unreasonable under fourth
amendment).
4. See infra notes 208-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of history
antecedent to the fourth amendment.
5. See infra notes 45-68 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Supreme Court's treatment of searches incident to an arrest for traffic offenses.
6. See, e.g., People v. Lichtenheld, 44 TIl. App. 3d 647,358 N.E.2d 694 (1976)
(officer, after observing defendant driving with burnt-out headlight, has authority
to require defendant to stop).
7. See, e.g., People v. Mathis, 55 TIl. App. 3d 680, 371 N.E.2d 245 (1977) (of-
ficer has authority to request traffic offender to go to station to post bond when
driver is unable to produce valid license).
8. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-118(d)(2) (Supp. 1988) (offender will be
released from custody after signing citation).
9. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. FRoe. LAw § 140.10(1)(a) (McKinney 1986) (permits
any officer to arrest for any offense committed in his presence); id § 140.21 (McKin-
ney 1986) (requires performance of certain procedures following arrest until ulti-
mate appearance before magistrate who may then release).
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ons. lO Rather, the search involves the entire body of the
arrestee, including the contents of pockets, pocketbooks, and
containers found in pockets or within the driver's reach. In-
deed, the search is not even limited to the driver's body; it can
include the entire passenger compartment of the car. The per-
missible scope of the search includes "closed or open glove com-
partments, consoles, or other receptacles located anywhere
within the passenger compartment, as well a luggage, boxes,
bags, clothing, and the like."ll In most jurisdictions, failure to
notice that one's taillight is out subjects one and one's posses-
sions to the same loss of privacy as an arrest for robbery,12
Wide-ranging searches conducted on the basis of such ubiq-
uitous events as traffic violations are subject to abuse. Almost
every American adult drives; hence the pool of potential ar-
restees is enormous.13 The innumerable rules and regulations
governing vehicular travel make it difficult not to violate one of
them at one time or another. ''Very few drivers can traverse
any appreciable distance without violating some traffic regula-
tion."14 The police officer's unconditional power creates the dan-
ger that the discretion to arrest for a traffic violation will be
exercised as a pretext to enable the officer to search. Such a
10. A frisk is a search, usually limited to a patting of the suspect's outer cloth-
ing, in an effort to determine, without going inside the pockets or under the outer
surface of the garments, whether the suspect possesses any hard object that might
be a weapon. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (l968).
11. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460-61 nA (1981).
12. See infra notes 188-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of police
discretion to arrest for traffic violations.
13. In 1986, there were an estimated 154,435,000 licensed drivers in the
United States who were 18 years of age or older. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 581 table 1001
(l08th ed. 1988). Millions of traffic tickets are issued each year. Although there
are no national statistics, a sampling of just a few states is ample evidence of the
size of the potential pool. In New York alone there were 1,593,195 convictions for
moving violations in 1985. NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT,
1986-1987 NEW YORK STATE STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 274 (l3th ed.). A small state
like Connecticut convicted 288,420 persons of moving violations in 1987. Tele-
phone interview with Don Williams, Connecticut Department of State Police (Sept.
6,1988). The California Highway patrol issued 3,111,769 citations for moving vio-
lations in 1987. Telephone interview with Beverly Christ, Management Informa-
tion Section of the California Highway Patrol Jurisdiction (Sept. 12, 1988).
14. B.J. GEORGE, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL
CASES 23 (1966).
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search might be motivated "simply to satisfy his [or her] curios-
ity, to pursue vague suspicions, or even to harass."15
In an article written immediately after United States v.
Robinson,16 in which the Supreme Court refused to distinguish
between searches incident to an arrest for a traffic violation and
those incident to arrests for more serious offenses, Professor
Wayne LaFave called the problem of traffic arrests as a pretext
to search the "Robinson Dilemma" and suggested various meas-
ures to prevent arbitrary exercise of police power in this con-
text,17 Although the Court has never directly addressed the
pretext problems raised by Professor LaFave, state courts and
legislatures have. A few states reject the holding in Robinson
and limit the power to search incident to a traffic offense. ls
Courts in other states struggle to identify pretextual arrests
and, when identified, suppress evidence discovered in a subse-
quent search.19 Some legislatures restrict the police power to
arrest for minor offenses, but do so ineffectively. 20 Very few ju-
risdictions have solved the Robinson Dilemma either judicially
or legislatively.
Restricting the power to arrest is the most rational and ef-
fective solution to preventing unjustified searches incident to
arrest for traffic offenses, since without an arrest the necessity
for permitting a search vanishes. This article makes the case
that the fourth amendment prohibits these arrests. Part I ex-
amines the Supreme Court decisions that permitted the prob-
lem to develop. Part II evaluates the solutions proposed by
other commentators, surveys how the fifty states have re-
sponded, and concludes that few states have satisfactorily elim-
inated the danger of pretextual arrests. Part III considers the
fourth amendment implications of custodial arrests for traffic
offenses and shows that the authority to arrest for a traffic of-
15. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PITI'. L.
REV. 227, 281 (1984).
16. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
17. LaFave, "Case-By-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures":
The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127.
18. See infra notes 149-55 and accompanying text for a list of states rejecting
Robinson.
19. See infra notes 121-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of suppres-
sion of evidence on a showing of pretext.
20. See infra notes 187-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of state lim-
itations on police discretion to conduct searches.
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fense creates power to search tantamount to the unlimited and
arbitrary authority that led to the adoption of the fourth
amendment.21 Part III also shows that custodial arrests for mi-
nor offenses have neither historical nor practical justification.22
Recent decisions by the Supreme Court provide a basis for ex-
amining the reasonableness of government intrusions and lead
to the conclusion that custodial arrests for minor traffic infrac-
tions offend the requirements of the fourth amendment.23 After
balancing the government's need for custodial arrests and the
individual's right to be free from unreasonable seizures, this ar-
ticle concludes that there is little need to arrest for most traffic
offenses. With the exception of people who cannot furnish iden-
tification, there is no legitimate governmental need to arrest for
any traffic offense other than driving while intoxicated. There-
fore, the fourth amendment should be recognized to prohibit
custodial arrest for other traffic offenders. Such a rule satisfies
both the government's need to enforce the traffic laws and pre-
vents serious intrusions on a person's privacy by avoiding the
possibility, otherwise not subject to effective limitation, of
pretextual arrests.
I. How the Supreme Court Created the Unconditional Power
to Conduct Far-Reaching Searches of a Traffic
Offender
Although the Court has frequently said that searches with-
out warrants are ·the exception rather than the rule,24 the re-
verse is actually true.25 One of the oldest exceptions to the
search warrant requirement, search incident to the arrest of a
21. See infra notes 205-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of reasons
for the fourth amendment's adoption and their relation to traffic violations.
22. See infra notes 240-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of the his-
torical and practical justifications for custodial arrests for minor offenses.
23. See infra notes 258-87 and accompanying text for a discussion of Supreme
Court opinions concerning custodial arrests for minor traffic violations.
24. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 242 (1973); Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967); McDonald v. United States, 335
U.S. 451, 453 (1948).
25. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE introduction of commen-
tary at 156-58 (Proposed Official Draft. No.1, 1972) (although the Supreme Court
has repeatedly stressed constitutional importance of warrants, as practical matter,
searches without warrant and incidental to arrest have been ofgreater importance
and frequency).
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suspect, permits warrantless searches more often than police
receive permission to search by warrant.26 Searches of traffic
violators are justified under this exception to the warrant re-
quirement. A police officer may conduct such a search based
exclusively on the authority to arrest a person for a traffic of-
fense. An officer need not have any particular reason to think
that weapons or evidence of crime will be found. The far-reach-
ing search power that the Supreme Court now permits incident
to such an arrest increases the danger of arbitrary arrests for
traffic offenses. Unconditional power to search permits a police
officer to legally search an individual by arresting the person for
violation of a minor traffic ordinance, and therefore bypass the
normal probable cause and warrant requirements of the fourth
amendment. The Court granted this power to search because of
its desire to define the search-incident-to-arrest exception in
such a way as to make it easy for police officers to determine
when and where they may search. But the development of the
exception has not run a straight course.
A. Search Incident to Arrest Exception
Searches of both person and place incident to lawful arrest
have traditionally been made without the prior approval of a
magistrate.27 As early as 1914, in United States v. Weeks,28 the
Court alluded to "the right on the part of the Government, al-
ways recognized under English and American law, to search the
person of the accused when legally arrested to discover and
seize the fruits or evidence of crime."29 The Court noted that
"[t]his right has been uniformly maintained in many cases."30
Like most of the exceptions to the warrant requirement, the jus-
tification for these warrantless searches was originally based on
an emergency.3! The necessity for warrantless action incident
26. Id. at 183.
27. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 224.
28. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
29. Id. at 392.
30. Id.
31. See Mascolo, The Emergency Doctrine Exception to the Warrant Require-
ment Under the Fourth Amendment, 22 BUFFALO L. REV. 429, 425 (1973). The ex-
ceptions to the warrant requirement include the following: automobile searches,
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); searches pursuant to consent,
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968); seizures in plain view, Coolidge v.
7
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to arrest is founded on the reasonable need to disarm an arres-
tee and to prevent him or her from destroying evidence.32
Search incident to arrest differs from other exceptions to the
warrant requirement in that it not only permits the government
to search without a warrant, but also permits a search without
probable cause to believe that evidence of criminal activity will
be found during the search. All that is required is a valid
arrest.
The Court has not always been clear on the appropriate
scope of a search incident; its contours have ebbed and flowed.33
Carroll v. United States34 spoke of "whatever is found upon [the
arrestee's] person or in [the arrestee's] control,"35 but only a
year later the Court viewed search-incident as including not
only the right to search the person arrested but "[t]he right ...
to search the place where the arrest is made."36 Search incident
reached its broadest scope in 1947 when the Court upheld a
search of a defendant's entire five room apartment.37
The Court restricted the scope of search incident in Chimel
v. California. 38 Police officers arrived at Chimel's house with a
warrant to arrest him for the burglary of a coin shop. Mter ar-
resting him, the officers looked through the entire three-bed-
room house, including the attic, the garage, and a small
workshop. In some rooms they opened and searched drawers.39
After reviewing the body of law that created and extended the
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); limited searches and seizures under the stop
and frisk doctrine, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); searches and seizures on hot
pursuit of a fleeing felon, United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976); and
searches and seizures in exigent circumstances, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294
(1967).
32. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (arresting officer may
search suspect's person to discover and remove weapons, and to seize evidence to
prevent its destruction and may also search area "within immediate control" of
suspect).
33. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973) (extent of area
subject to search incident to arrest inconsistently interpreted in Court's decisions).
34. 267 U.S. 132 (1925>-
35. Id. at 158.
36. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.s. 20, 30 (1925).
37. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947). "One agent was assigned to
each room of the apartment and, over petitioner's protest, a careful and thorough
search proceeded for approximately five hours." Id. at 149.
38. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
39. Id. at 753-54.
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search-incident exception, the Court concluded that the doc-
trine's broad development could "withstand neither historical
nor rational analysis."40 In another context,41 the Court had re-
cently held "[t]he scope of [a] search must be 'strictly tied to and
justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation per-
missible."42 Applying the rationale in Chimel, the Court rea-
soned that,
[wlhen an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer
to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that
the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his
escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be endangered,
and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reason-
able for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence
on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or de-
struction. And the area into which an arrestee might reach in
order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be
governed by a like rule.43
Thus, the Court concluded that the only justifications for per-
mitting a search broader than the arrestee's person were to pro-
tect the police and to prevent destruction ofevidence that might
be within easy reach of the arrestee. The proper scope of a
search incident was therefore only the arrestee's person and
"grabbable area."44
40. Id. at 760.
41. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry, the Court considered the pro-
priety of a search to protect the safety of an officer during a street encounter when
the officer's knowledge falls short of probable cause to arrest the suspect. The
Court concluded that such a search is permitted provided it is limited to a frisk.
Id. at 4·8, 27.
42. Id. at 19 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (Fortas, J.,
concurring», quoted in Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762.
43. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762-63.
44. Id. at 763. The Court explained:
A gun on the table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as
dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the
person arrested. There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the
arrestee's person and the area "within his immediate control"-construing
that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of
a weapon or destructible evidence.
Id.
9
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B. Search Incident to an Arrest for a Traffic Violation
Chimel thus clearly defined the scope of a search incident to
an arrest for a crime. But what of arrests for traffic offenses?
One could reasonably argue that since a police officer would not
normally expect the average traffic violator to be armed and,
since for most traffic offenses there is no real evidence that can
be destroyed, searches incident to these arrests should be lim-
ited to a frisk or perhaps not permitted at all. The Supreme
Court addressed this problem in three cases.
1. United States v. Robinson and Gustafson v. Florida
In 1973 the Court decided United States v. Robinson45 and
Gustafson v. Florida,46 both of which involved searches incident
to arrests for traffic offenses. In each, the defendant had argued
that the searches, which uncovered narcotics, were illegal be-
cause the officers did not fear that the defendants were armed
and because the traffic offenses involved no destructible evi-
dence.47 Accordingly, the justifications for a full search incident
to arrest as articulated in Chimel48 were absent.
In Robinson, a police officer observed the defendant driving.
The officer knew from an encounter with Robinson only four
days earlier that his operator's permit had been revoked, so he
signaled Robinson to stop and arrested him for "operating after
revocation and obtaining a permit by misrepresentation."49
Pursuant to departmental guidelines, the officer began to
search Robinson and, feeling a soft object in the breast pocket of
his coat, removed a crumpled cigarette package containing four-
45. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
46. 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
47. United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1094 m.c. Cir. 1972) (officer
searched person arrested for operating motor vehicle without valid license and
found 14 capsules of heroin; search held unconstitutional because officer only had
probable cause to believe suspect possessed fraudulently obtained temporary oper-
ator's permit), rev'd, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 243 So. 2d 615, 625
(Fla. 1971) (officer exceeded scope of custodial search by removing cigarette pack-
age from defendant's coat pocket and examining its contents), affd, 414 U.S. 260
(1973).
48. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of the justi-
fications for a full search incident to arrest as explained by the Chimel Court.
49. 414 U.S. at 220.
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teen gelatin capsules of white powder which turned out to be
heroin.50
The court of appeals viewed Robinson as squarely present-
ing the question of whether a person can be subjected to a full
search of the person incident to an arrest for a mere traffic vio-
lation:51 In deciding to suppress the narcotics, the court consid-
ered Chimel controlling and, noting the Supreme Court's
requirement that the search be strictly justified by the circum-
stances that rendered its initiation permissible, concluded that
a reviewing court's" 'inquiry is a dual one-whether the of-
ficer's action was justified at its inception, and whether it was
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified
the interference in the first place.' "52 The court specifically
identified the two justifications for an arrest-based search of the
person as being "1) seizure of fruits, instrumentalities and other
evidence of the crime for which the arrest is made in order to
prevent its [sic] destruction or concealment; and 2) removal of
any weapons that the arrestee might seek to use to resist arrest
or effect his escape"53 and then considered whether these objec-
tives could justify a full search in a traffic case.
The court concluded that the search of Willie Robinson
could not be based on the first justification since the officer al-
ready possessed the only possible evidence of the offense, the
fraudulently-obtained temporary operator's permit.54 The sec-
ond justification, however, could not be so easily dismissed.
Even if a traffic offender is less likely to be armed than one
thought guilty of a criminal offense, a police officer is in danger
when placing anyone in custody.55 The close proximity and ex-
tended contact between an officer and an arrestee subjects the
officer to greater risk than the momentary and relatively minor
dangers presented in either the stop-and-frisk situation or in
50. Id. at 221-23.
51. United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082,1090 (D.C. Cir. 1972), rev'd, 414
U.S. 218 (1973).
52. Id. at 1093 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968».
53.Id.
54. Id. at 1094.
55. Placing a person in custody should be distinguished from the mere issu-
ance of a summons and permitting the driver to drive away.
11
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the routine traffic stop.56 The court decided, therefore, that a
search in this case was justified.57
Having made that decision, the court went on to consider
whether the search was reasonably related in scope to the cir-
cumstances that justified it. The court concluded that "where,
as in the routine traffic arrest there can be no evidentiary basis
for a search, the most intrusive search the Constitution will al-
low is a limited frisk for weapons."58 Relying on the Supreme
Court's rationale in Terry v. Ohio,59 the court held that a search
incident to an arrest for a traffic offense must be limited to a
pat-down frisk. 60 Only if the frisk reveals something suspicious
would a full search be permitted.61 In Robinson, therefore, ex-
amining the contents of a soft crumpled cigarette package was
beyond the scope of a frisk and without any appropriate predi-
cate.62 Based on this analysis, the court of appeals reversed
Robinson's conviction.63
The Supreme Court disagreed with the circuit court on two
counts. First, the Cpurt took issue with the idea that the only
justification for a full search incident to lawful arrest was
preventing the destruction of evidence.64 Rather, the Court
held, "[t]he justification or reason for the authority to search in-
56. 471 F.2d at 1098.
57.Id.
58. Id. at 1095 (emphasis in original).
59. 392 U.S. 1 (1967). In Terry, the Supreme Court considered the fourth
amendment implications of a common police practice called stop and frisk. A stop
is a brief detention of a person which enables the police to investigate suspicious
behavior and which can be based on less than probable cause to arrest. Ifth officer
has reasonable grounds to believe that the suspect is armed or dangerous, he is
permitted to frisk (conduct a limited search of the suspect's outer garments by
patting them from the outside) in order to determine whether the suspect is
armed. In permitting the frisk, the Court noted that "it must be limited to that
which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which might be used to harm the
officer or others nearby." Id. at 26.
60. Robinson, 471 F.2d at 1097-98. However, unlike the decision in Terry,
which required police to have a reason to believe the suspect was armed or danger-
ous before even a frisk was permitted, the circuit court concluded that a frisk
might be conducted whenever a police officer makes a custodial arrest, even
though the officer has no particularized suspicion that the suspect is armed. Id. at
1097.
61. Id. at 1098.
62.Id.
63. Id. at 1088.
64. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 233.
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cident to a lawful arrest rests quite as much on the need to dis-
arm the suspect in order to take him into custody as it does on
the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use at
trial. "65 A full search is required for a custodial arrest because
the extended contact and close proximity between the officer
and the arrestee permits an arrestee more time to retrieve a
hidden or small weapon that might not be discovered in a frisk.
The question was not whether one arrested for a traffic offense
was as likely to be armed as a suspect stopped for a criminal
offense. The danger was created by the opportunity to use a
razor or other small weapon if the traffic offender possessed
one.66
Second, the Court soundly repudiated the lower court's
case-by-case determination as to whether the underlying justifi-
cations for a search incident to an arrest were present in the
Robinson case. The Court concluded that although the right to
search was based upon the need to disarm and to discover evi-
dence, its authority came automatically from the right to arrest
and did not depend on a case-by-case determination of neces-
sity. Recognizing that "[a] police officer's determination as to
how and where to search the person of a suspect whom he has
arrested is necessarily a quick ad hoc judgment,"67 the Court
wanted the rules to clearly reflect the officer's authority. The
Court concluded:
It is the fact of the lawful arrest which established the authority
to search, and we hold that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest
a full search of the person is not only an exception to the require-
ment of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a "reasonable" search
under that Amendment.68
After Robinson, it is clear that an arrest for a traffic violation is
to be treated like any other arrest. Since it is the fact of arrest
that gives officers the power to search, the reason for the arrest
is irrelevant in determining the power to search or the scope of
a search.
65. Id. at 234.
66. Id. at 234-35.
67. Id. a 235.
68. Id.
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The officer arrested Robinson because the procedures under
which the officer operated required it.69 The decision to arrest
was not discretionary and therefore could ot be used as a pre-
text to search someone who might not otherwise have been ar-
rested. But what about the case in which the power to arrest is
discretionary? There is a real danger of custodial arrests as
pretexts to search in such a situation. The Court might have
eliminated the danger of traffic arrests as pretexts for searches
by permitting arrests and searches only pursuant to established
police regulations.70 However, on the same day the court de-
cided Robinson, it decided its companion case, Gustafson v.
Florida. 71
James Gustafson was a college student who went out one
night, leaving his driver's license in his dormitory room.72 A po-
lice officer was on routine patrol when he observed Gustafson's
car weaving across the center line and back to the right side of
69. [d. at 221 n.2.
70. See Amsterdam, Perspectives On The Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
REV. 349, 416 (1974). Professor Amsterdam argues that if the Court had distin-
guished Robinson from Gustafson on the basis of the presence of local police regu-
lations it would have "made by far the greatest contribution to the jurisprudence of
the fourth amendment since James Otis argued against the writs of assistance in
1761." [d. Professor Amsterdam fears the arbitrary exercise of discretion by a
police officer. To prevent that danger he would have all searches and" seizures
evaluated by these three rules:
1) Unless a search or seizure is conducted pursuant to and in conformity
with either legislation or police departmental rules and regulations, it is an
unreasonable search and seizure prohibited by the fourth amendment. 2)
The legislation or police-made rules must be reasonably particular in setting
forth the nature of the searches and seizures and the circumstances under
which they should be made. 3) The legislation or rules must, of course, be
conformable with all additional requirements imposed by the fourth amend-
ment upon searches and seizures of the sorts that they authorize.
[d. at 416-17.
The Supreme Court has recognized the role of standardized procedures in con-
trolling arbitrary police action by requiring that administrative warrants show
reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting inspections. See
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967) (fourth amendment bars
warrantless administrative searches to enforce Housing Code). It has also sug-
gested that other standard police procedures are acceptable only pursuant to stan-
dard regulations. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.s. 364, 376 (1976)
(automobile inventories must be carried out in accordance with standard proce-
dures of local police department).
71. 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
72. [d. at 262.
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the road.73 The officer stopped the car and, after learning from
Gustafson that he was licensed but did not have his license with
him, arrested and searched him.74 The officer placed his hand
in the left front coat pocket of Gustafson's coat and extracted a
cigarette box.75 He opened the box and discovered marijuana
cigarettes.76 Gustafson was charged with possession of the ma-
rijuana and driving without an operator's license. The latter
charge was dropped when Gustafson subsequently produced his
license.77
There are a number of important differences between
Robinson and Gustafson. First, Gustafson had no previous en-
counters with the officer and was arrested for a minor offense,78
one for which the officer more often that not did not arrest.79
Second, and of greater importance because this is what creates
the opportunity for arbitrary searches, there were no police reg-
ulations requiring the officer to take Gustafson into custody or
to search him.80 The Court, however, after noting these differ-
ences, reached the same result that it had in Robinson. With
the authority to arrest came the authority to search. In both
cases the defendant was arrested. That fact, and that fact
alone, justified the search.81 The constitutional validity of ar-
73. [d.
74. [d.
75. [d.
76. [d.
77. [d. at 261-63.
78. [d. at 263.
79. [d. at 265 n.3.
80. [d. at 263.
81. [d. at 265. The propriety of the arrest was not at issue in either case.
Gustafson fully conceded the constitutional validity of his custodial arrest. [d. at
267. That being so, consideration of any constitutional challenge to the arrest was
foreclosed. However, Justice Stewart's concurrence in Gustafson consisted of a
brief comment which noted that, although the defendant had not challenged his
arrest, an arrest for a minor traffic offense might violate the fourth amendment.
[d. at 266-67 (Stewart, J., concurring). See infra note 198 and accompanying test
for Justice Stewart's comments. Justice Powell also commented on the questiona-
ble validity of Gustafson's arrest. In his concurrence, he noted that Gustafson
conceded the validity of the custodial arrest although that conclusion was
not as self-evident as in Robinson. Gustafson would have presented a differ-
ent question if the petitioner could have proved that he was taken into cus-
tody only to afford a pretext for a search actually undertaken for collateral
objectives. But no such question is before us.
15
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rests for traffic offenses has not been considered in the years
since Robinson and Gustafson.82
2. New York v. Belton
In New York v. Belton,83 the Court considered the appropri-
ate scope of a search incident to arrest, rather than the author-
ity to conduct such a search. Roger Belton and three friends
were riding in an automobile and passed an unmarked patrol
car at an excessive rate of speed.84 The trooper in the patrol car
overtook the vehicle, in which Belton was a passenger, and or-
dered the driver to pull over.85 As the officer examined the
driver's license and the car's registration he smelled burnt ma-
rijuana and saw an envelope marked "Supergold" on the floor of
the car.86 He told all the men to get out of the car and placed
them under arrest for possession of marijuana.87 He frisked
each man, "split them up into four separate areas of the
Thruway ... so they would not be in physical touching area of
each other," and handcuffed them.88 Only then did he search
the passenger compartment of the car, discovering Belton's
black leather jacket on the back seat.89 The officer opened the
zippered pocket of the jacket and found cocaine.90
Belton was convicted of possession of cocaine.91 He ap-
pealed, claiming that the cocaine had been discovered illegally,
and the New York Court of Appeals agreed.92 The court held
Robinson, 414 U.S. at 238 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring in both Robinson and
Gustafson).
82. Part III of this article will consider the constitutional validity of arrests
for traffic offenses in greater detail. See infra notes 193-354.
83. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
84. Id. at 455.
85.Id.
86. Id. at 455-56.
87. Id. at 456. Belton was subject to arrest for the marijuana found in the
passenger compartment of the automobile because N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.25(1)
(McKinney 1980) provides that the presence of a controlled substance in a car is
presumptive evidence of knowing possession by each and every person in the auto-
mobile at the time the substance was found.
88. 453 U.S. at 456.
89.Id.
90.Id.
91. Id.
92. People v. Belton, 50 N.Y.2d 447, 407 N.E.2d 420, 429 N.Y.S.2d 574 (1980),
rev'd, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). The New York Court of Appeals began its opinion with
the following statement:
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that the search was beyond the scope permitted by the search-
incident exception since all of the occupants had been removed
from the car and were in handcuffs.93 The inside of the car was,
therefore, well beyond their "grabbing area."94
The Supreme Court seized upon this case as an opportunity
to reduce confusion by creating a straightforward, easily-ap-
plied, and predictably-enforced rule.95 Justice Stewart, writing
for the Court, stated the question as: "[w]hen the occupant of
an automobile is subjected to a lawful custodial arrest, does the
constitutionally permissible scope of a search incident to his
arrest include the passenger compartment of the automobile in
which he is riding?"96
Rather than considering the traditional justifications for
search incident to arrest to determine the propriety of its scope
(as articulated in Chimel), the Court looked to Robinson and
again "rejected the suggestion that 'there must be litigated in
each case the issue of whether or not there was present one of
the reasons supporting the authority for a search of the person
incident to a lawful arrest.' "97 Instead, the Court established a
bright-line rule that permits a police officer to search the pas-
senger compartment of a car whenever he arrests a recent occu-
pant of the car, regardless of the surrounding circumstances.98
The officer may not only search the passenger compartment, he
may also search any containers found therein.99 "Container
here denotes any object capable of holding another object. It
thus includes closed or open glove compartments, consoles, or
other receptacles located anywhere within the passenger com-
A warrantless search of the zippered pockets of an unaccessible jacket may
not be upheld as a search incident to a lawful arrest where there is no longer
any danger that the arrestee or a confederate might gain access to the
article.
Id. at 449, 407 N.E.2d at 422, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 575.
93. Id. at 449, 407 N.E.2d at 422, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 575.
94.Id.
95. Belton, 453 U.S. at 459.
96. Id. at 455.
97. Id. at 459 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973».
98. Id. at 460.
99.Id.
17
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partment, as well as luggage, boxes, bags, clothing and the
like."lOo
The Court's broad rule does not by its terms apply to ar-
rests for traffic offenses. Belton, after all, was arrested for pos-
session of marijuana, not for a violation of a traffic ordinance.
However, both Belton and Robinson are designed to relieve po-
lice officers from having to determine on a case-by-case basis
whether and where they may search. Both explicitly evidence a
desire to treat all searches incident to arrest similarly.lOI Bel-
ton does make clear that its holding applies. to the scope of
searches incident to the arrest of an occupant of an automo-
bile. 102 There is no indication whatsoever that .the occupant
must be arrested for a serious crime or even for a criminal of-
fense. In his dissent in Robbins v. California,l°3 decided the
same day as Belton, Justice Stevens affirmatively stated his be-
lief that Belton permits searches of the entire passenger com-
partment incident to an arrest for a traffic offense.104 That
Belton permits the police to search the private possessions
found in any automobile when a person is arrested for a traffic
100. [d. at 460 n.4. The decision in Belton does not permit searches of auto-
mobile trunks. [d. Such a search is permitted only with probable cause to believe
evidence of criminal activity is located within the car. Ross v. United States, 456
U.S. 798, 823 (1982). Nor does it permit a warrantless search of a container that
happens to be found in a car if the container does not fall within the search inci-
dent exception either because there was not probable cause to arrest the occupants
of the car or because no recent occupant of the car had been arrested at the time
the container was seized. Chadwick v. United States, 433 U.S. I, 12-13 (1977).
101. Belton, 453 U.S. at 459-460; Robinson, 414 U.s. at 235.
102. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 455.
103. 453 U.S. 420 (1981).
104. See id. at 450-51 & n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Referring to the deci-
sion in Belton Justice Stevens stated:
[A driver stopped for a traffic offense] could make no constitutional objection
to a decision by the officer to take the driver into custody and thereby obtain
justification for a search of the entire interior of the vehicle. Indeed, under
the Court's new rule [in Belton], the arresting officer may find reason to
follow that procedure whenever he sees an interesting looking briefcase or
package in a vehicle that has been stopped for a traffic violation. That deci-
sion by a police officer will therefore provide the constitutional predicate for
broader vehicle searches than any neutral magistrate could authorize by is-
suing a warrant.
[d. at 452 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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offense is also attested to by the numerous state court decisions
that have upheld such searches.105
As a result of Robinson, Gustafson, and Belton, police of-
ficers now have unconditional power to make far-reaching
searches of anyone arrested for a traffic offense. Robinson de-
clares that traffic offenders will be treated like any other arres-
tee.Gustafson ignores the discretionary nature of the decision
to arrest for a-traffic offense, thereby permitting police to exer-
105. See e.g., Clifton v. State, 501 So. 2d 539, 540 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986)
(search of passenger compartment following arrest for driving while intoxicated
("DWI"»; State v. Hersch, 135 Ariz. 528, 531, 662 P.2d 1035, 1038 (1983) (search of
luggage in passenger compartment of car after arrest for DWI); Traylor v. State,
458 A.2d 1170, 1174 (Del. Super. Ct. 1983) (search of passenger compartment inci-
dent to arrest for driving with suspended license); State v. Williams, 516 So. 2d
1081, 1083 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (search ofpassenger compartment incident to
arrest for reclP-ess driving); Dixon v. State, 180 Ga. App. 222, 225, 348 S.E.2d 742,
745 (1986) (search-of passenger compartment incident to arrest for speeding and
driving with suspended license); People v. Grigsby, 111 lll. App. 3d 38, 42, 443
N.E.2d 746, 749 (1982) (search of glove compartment incident to arrest for driving
without license plates and with suspended license); Fraiser v. State, 262 Ind. 59,
65,312 N.E.2d 77, 80 (1974) (search of paper bag in passenger compartment inci-
dent to arrest for driving with noisy mufller); State v. Deskins, 234 Ran. 529, 542-
43, 673 P.2d 1174, 1186 (1983) (search of passenger compartment incident to
arrest for DWI); Commonwealth v. Ramsey, 744 S.W.2d 418, 418 (Ky. 1987)
(search of passenger compartment incident to arrest for DWI); State v. Laplante,
534 A.2d 959, 962 (Me. 1987) (search of passenger compartment incident to arrest
for improper license tags and driving without license); Parker v. State, 66 Md. App.
I, 9, 502 A.2d 510, 514 (1986) (search of container in passenger compartment inci-
dent to arrest for driving without license); Horton v. State, 408 So. 2d 1197, 1998
(Miss. 1982) (search of passenger compartment after stop for no license plates);
State v. Miskolczi, 123 N.H. 626, 628, 465 A.2d 919, 920 (1983) (search of passen-
ger compartment after arrest for DWI); State v. Cooper, 304 N.C. 701, 705, 286
S.E.2d 102, 103 (1982) (search of passenger compartment and containers found
inside after arrest for DWI); State v. Hensel, 417 N.W.2d 849, 852 (N.D. 1988)
(search of passenger compartment after arrest for DWI); State v. Rice, 69 Ohio St.
2d 442, 424, 433 N.E.2d 175, 180 (1982) (search of passenger compartment after
arrest for DWI); Commonwealth v. Henry, 358 Pa. Super. 306, 307, 517 A.2d 559,
560 (1986) (search of closed container after stop for speeding); Williams v. State,
726 S.W.2d 99,99 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (search of container in passenger com-
partment after arrest for parking on wrong side of street); State v. K.K.C., 636
P.2d 1044, 1047 (Utah 1981) (search of passenger compartment after arrest of ju-
venile for drinking in motor vehicle). See also LaFave, "Seizures" Typology: Classi-
fying Detentions of the Person to Resolve Warrant, Grounds, and Search Issues, 17
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 417, 438-42 (1984) (discussing danger of arbitrary arrests for
minor crimes because of the Robinson /Belton search power); Rudstein, The Search
of an Automobile Incident to an Arrest: An Analysis of New York v. Belton, 67
MARQ. L. REV. 205, 248 (1984) (broad rule of constitutional law fashioned by the
court in Belton potentially applies to the stop of every traffic offender).
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cise that discretion at will. Belton extends the scope of a per-
missible search incident to an arrest of a recent occupant of a
car to include private areas well beyond what safety requires.
These decisions leave in their wake the possibility that police
officers will use traffic offenses as pretexts for searches. Others
have addressed this difficulty and proposed solutions. The next
section considers those proposals and demonstrates why they
are inadequate to deal with the problem that the Court has
created.
II. Perspectives on Robinson
The danger of arbitrary exercise of police authority inher-
ent in unconditional power to conduct far-reaching searches of a
traffic offender has not gone unnoticed. Professor Wayne
LaFave was among the many who commented on Robinson and
Gustafson immediately after they were decided. lOG Professor
LaFave was one of the earliest advocates of limiting case-by-
case adjudication of fourth amendment problems in favor of
standardized procedures.107 He stated that fourth amendment
doctrine should be expressed by rules "not qualified by all sorts
of ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nu-
ances and hairline distinctions"lo8 for guiding police conduct.
There can be no doubt that the decision in Robinson creates a
clear rule not dependent on case-by-case adjudication. None-
theless, LaFave was not entirely enthusiastic about the Court's
work. He agreed with the Court's holding that the general au-
thority to search incident to a lawful custodial arrest should be
106. See LaFave, supra note 17. See also Aaronson & Wallace, A Reconsidera-
tion of the Fourth Amendment's Doctrine of Search Incident to Arrest, 64 GEO. L.J.
53 (1975); Nakell, Search of the Person Incident to a Traffic Arrest: A Comment on
Robinson and Gustafson, 10 CRIM. L. BULL. 827 (1974); White, The Fourth Amend-
ment As A Way Of Talking About People: A Study ofRobinson and Matlock, 1974
SUP. CT. REV. 165.
107. See LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through the Exclusionary
Rule (pt. 2), 30 Mo. L. REV. 566, 592 (1965) (courts will be unable to make greater
contributions without effective legislative action); LaFave, Warrantless Searches
and the Supreme Court: Further Ventures into the "Quagmire, n 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 9,
76-77 n.4 (1972) (suggesting that rules need greater clarity and should be ex-
pressed in terms that police can understand).
108. LaFave, supra note 17, at 141.
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unqualified,109 but thought that arrests for minor traffic viola-
tions should be a special case. l1O He noted that not only are the
traditional justifications for search incident to arrest not as
compelling in the case of traffic violations,III but also argued
that searches incident to such an arrest should be restricted for
a "more powerful reason."112 Professor LaFave was concerned
that police officers would use a traffic offense as a pretext to
conduct a search that they might not otherwise be empowered
to make.
Given the fact that 'in most jurisdictions and for most traffic of-
fenses the determination of whether to issue a citation or effect a
full arrest is discretionary with the officer,' and that 'very few
drivers can traverse any appreciable distance without violating
some traffic regulation,' this is indeed a frightening possibility. It
is apparent that virtually everyone who ventures out onto the
public streets and highways may then, with little effort by the po-
lice, be placed in a position where he is subject to a full search.
Nor is one put at ease by what evidence exists as to police prac-
tices in this regard; it is clear that this subterfuge is employed as
a means for searching for evidence on the persons of suspects who
109. Professor LaFave first examined prior Supreme Court decisions and then
the evidence on the intent of the Framers of the fourth amendment. He agreed
with the Robinson Court that neither principles of stare decisis nor the evidence of
the original intent of the Framers of the Constitution foreclosed the Court from
holding that a full search of the person arrested flows automatically from the fact
of the arrest without any additional showing, but he also concluded that neither
source required such a rule. [d. at 136. Although the Robinson Court had not done
so, he thought it would be useful to examine whether the "general authority" to
search incident to arrest ought to be unqualified. Id. at 137-45. LaFave concluded
that search incident is the kind of search that ought to be unlimited and controlled
by a rule that could be expressed in terms of "standardized procedures" for four
reasons: 1) it occurs frequently and under an infinite variety ofcircumstances; 2) to
require the officer to make probable-cause-to-search decisions in each case would
be too difficult; 3) the decision to search an arrested person must be made quickly
and frequently unexpectedly; 4) the search of the person is less intrusive than a
search of a house and is only applicable to someone as to whom there are already
grounds to arrest. [d. at 143-44.
110. [d. at 150.
111. LaFave noted that, except in the rare case, there is no evidence of a traf-
fic offense to be destroyed. [d. He also observed that, even though traffic violators
as a class are less likely to be armed than other offenders, there is no way for a
police officer to know whether a particular traffic offender is armed. If the offender
turns out to be armed, the risk to the officer is genuine. [d. at 151-52.
112. [d. at 152.
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could not be lawfully arrested for the crimes of which they are
suspected. U3
To Professor LaFave, the specter ofthe pretext arrest loomed so
large that it had to be considered in formulating any rule.1l4
The use of a traffic offense as a subterfuge to search for evidence
of a more serious crime has been documented in empirical stud-
ies. U5 That police officers arrest for bad as well as good motives
cannot seriously be doubted.
Professor LaFave identified four possible solutions to the
problem of traffic arrests as pretexts for searches: 1) that evi-
dence discovered during a search incident to a traffic arrest be
suppressed on a showing that the arrest was a pretext; 2) that a
search incident to a traffic offense be limited in scope so as to
preclude its use to discover evidence other than weapons; 3)
that a full search be permitted incident to a traffic arrest, but
that any evidence discovered other than weapons be inadmissi-
ble in a criminal prosecution; or 4) that legislative or adminis-
trative procedures be developed that limit the power of the
police to arrest for a minor offense. None of the possible solu-
tions has been endorsed by the Supreme Court and none has
had enthusiastic acceptance in state courts, although some are
utilized in varying degrees. This section will examine each sug-
gestion in turn, both in the abstract and empirically.
A. Suppression on a Showing of Pretext
Professor LaFave thought that the most obvious solution
was to exclude evidence discovered during a search incident to a
traffic offense upon a showing that the arrest was a pretext to
113. Id. at 152-53 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Robinson, 414 U.S. at 248
(Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Douglas and Brennan, JJ.); B.J. GEORGE, CON-
STITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 65 (1973».
114. LaFave, supra note 17, at 153. Police officers themselves have testified
to the ease with which a traffic stop can be made for a pretextual purpose. One
officer is quoted as stating, "You can always get a guy legitimately on a traffic
violation if you tail him for a while, and then a search can be made." L. TIFFANY,
D. McINTYRE, & D. ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME 131 (1967) [hereinafter L.
TIFFANY]. Another reported, "You don't have to follow a driver very long before he
will move to the other side of the yellow line and then you can arrest and search
him for driving on the wrong side of the highway." Id.
115. See, e.g., L. TIFFANY, supra note 114, at 131-36; W. LAFAVE, ARRESTS;
THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 151-52 (1965).
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search,116 but also noted that this was the least effective way to
deal with this problem. 117 The difficulty with suppressing evi-
dence on a showing of pretext is that the legality of the search
will depend on the ability of the defendant to prove the motiva-
tion of the officer. As Justice White succinctly put it, "sending
state and federal courts on an expedition into the minds of po-
lice officers would produce a grave and fruitless misallocation of
judicial resources."118 Without an express admission of "bad
motive" by the officer, there will be no direct evidence on the
question.119
Even Professor Burkoff, the most confirmed advocate of this
solution, acknowledged the difficulty of proving motivation. 120
116. LaFave, supra note 17, at 153.
117. Id. at 154. Lafave stated, "I doubt whether it is within the ability of trial
and appellate co)ll'ts to determine with any fair rate of success the uncommuni-
cated intentions or expectations of the police officer." Id.
118.Massachusetts v. Painten, 389 U.S. 560, 565 (1968) (White, J.,
dissenting).
119. The improbability of an express statement by the offending officer has
been noted by Professor Anthony Amsterdam:
But surely the catch is not worth the trouble of the hunt when courts set out
to bag the secret motivations of policemen in this context. A subjective pur-
pose to do something that the applicable legal rules say there is sufficient
objective cause to do can be fabricated all too easily and undetectably. Moti-
vation is, in any event, a self-generating phenomenon: if a purpose to search
for heroin can legally be accomplished only when accompanied by a purpose
to search for a weapon, knowledgeable officers will seldom experience the
first desire without a simultaneous onrush of the second.
Amsterdam, supra note 70, at 436-37.
120. See Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, 57 NYU. L. REV. 70, 114 (1982) [here-
inafter Burkoff, Bad Faith] (extremely difficult to make unequivocal showing of
police officer's improper motive). For an interesting dialogue on whether subjec-
tive police motivation should be relevant in determining the legality of a search or
seizure, see id. (arguing in favor of considering subjective police intent); Burkoff,
Rejoinder: Truth, Justice, and the American Way-Or Professor Haddad's "Hard
Choices," 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 695 (1985) [hereinafter Burkoff, Rejoinder] (impor-
tant to permit evidence of improper police motive to deter pretext arrests and
searches); Burkoff, The Pretext Search Doctrine: Now You See It, Now You Don't,
17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 523 (1984) [hereinafter Burkoff, Pretext] (urging continued
support for the pretext search doctrine notwithstanding recent Supreme Court de-
cisions); Haddad, Pretextual Fourth Amendment Activity: Another Viewpoint, 18
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 639 (1985) [hereinafter Haddad, Another Viewpoint] (arguing
against the use of subjective police motivation in evaluating the lawfulness of po-
lice conduct); Haddad, Well-Delineated Exceptions, Claims of Sham, and Fourfold
Probable Cause, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 198, 204-14 (1977) [hereinafter
Haddad, Claims ofSham] (arguing in favor of narrowing police power rather than
considering subjective police motivation to limit searches and seizures).
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While motivation may be inferred from the totality of relevant
facts, cases in the area leave very little hope that courts will be
willing to reach that conc1usion. 121 Although some lower courts
suppress evidence when they believe the officer is engaging in
pretextual activity,122 most courts do not do so even when the
evidence of pretext is overwhelming.123 People v. Holloway124
121. LaFave, supra note 17, at 155. In support of this conclusion, Professor
LaFave cited three cases that he thought represented clear indications of pretext,
but in which the searches were upheld by the courts: People v. Watkins, 19 Ill. 2d
11, 19, 166 N.E.2d 433, 437 (after following defendant for some time, officers as-
signed to gambling squad arrested hin! for parking too close to crosswalk-"the
kind of minor offense that ordinarily results in a 'parking ticket' hung on the han-
dle ofthe door of the car"), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 833 (1960); Anderson v. State, 444
P.2d 239, 249 (Okla. Crim. App. 1968) (city policeman who arrested defendant for
making right turn from incorrect lane was accompanied by federal narcotics
agent), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1017 (1969); Adair v. State, 427 S.W.2d 67, 68 (Tex.
Crin!. App. 1968) (officer followed defendant for fifteen blocks because he looked
suspicious and then arrested hin! for changing lanes without signaling). LaFave,
supra note 17, at 155 n.130.
122. See, e.g., Richardson v. State, 288 Ark. 407, 410, 706 S.W.2d 363, 365
(1986) (evidence of murder and arson discovered in search incident to arrest for
public drunkenness suppressed where clear that police were investigating murder
and took defendant's clothes to search for evidence of murder); State v. Hoven, 269
N.W.2d 849, 851 (Minn. 1978) (evidence suppressed where discovered during in-
ventory search incident to arrest an old traffic warrants after police received tip
that defendant had drugs in his truck).
123. See, e.g., People v. Anderson, 169 Ill. App. 3d 289, 523 N.E.2d 1034
(1988). The defendant was suspected of murder but the police did not have prob-
able cause to arrest him. [d. at 291, 523 N.E.2d at 1036. The officers waited for
him to leave his office and then arrested him for driving with a suspended license,
interrogating him about the murder until he confessed. [d. The court stated that
the motive of the officers didn't matter so long as they had properly arrested the
defendant for the suspended license. [d. In Traylor v. State, 458 A.2d 1170 (Del.
1983), officers had observed the defendant engaging in suspicious activities while
sitting in his car in an area known for drug trafficking. [d. at 1173. The officers
learned that the defendant's license had been suspended after checking with head-
quarters. [d. After the defendant had driving away, the officers stopped the car
and arrested him for driving with a suspended license. [d. The court allowed the
search, which revealed drugs, because the officers had the authority to arrest for
the traffic offense. [d. In State v. Pickett, 126 Ariz. 173, 613 P.2d 837 (1980), the
arresting officer was en route to the police station just after having testified
against the appellant before the grand jury on an unrelated possession of stolen
property charge. [d. at 174, 613 P.2d 838. While driving, he recognized the appel-
lant and observed him drinking a bottle of beer in front of a liquor store. [d. He
told the appellant that he believed him to be in violation of a state law against
drinking in public and placed him in the rear of the officer's vehicle. [d. During
the inventory search of the defendant before he was incarcerated, incriminating
evidence was discovered. [d. The defendant argued that this was an offense for
which people were normally given a summons. [d. The Court said that the use of
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exemplifies a pretextual arrest. While investigating street
crime, including narcotics offenses, a police officer observed Hol-
loway, whom the officer knew from more than twenty previous
encounters and whom he had previously arrested for drug pos-
session.125 The officer arrested the defendant on a warrant for
driving with a suspended license, which the officer happened to
be carrying with him. 126 With no comment on why the officer,
who was not assigned to enforce traffic offenses, happened to
have an arrest warrant for a traffic offense in his pocket and
happened to select this warrant from the undoubtedly
thousands available at the stationhouse, the Michigan Supreme
Court said:
[t]he fact that the police officers effectuated the arrest also realiz-
ing that they might find narcotics or other evidence of illegal ac-
tivity is entirely irrelevant, unless police officers primarily
concerned with enforcing certain laws are prohibited from enforc-
ing other laws as well. We are aware of no such constitutional
proscription. 127
Yet, there can be no serious doubt that the police officer ar-
rested the defendant because the officer believed that the de-
fendant was involved in narcotics trafficking and that he did not
have probable cause to do so. He used the traffic offense war-
rant to effectuate an arrest and, as a result, had the authority to
search Holloway, thereby discovering the narcotics for which he
was actually charged. Obviously, the arrest on the warrant for
the citation/field release procedure is optional, not mandatory, and rejected the
claim of pretext. !d. In State v. Leagea, 442 So. 2d 699 (La. Ct. App. 1983), a
police officer was on special patrol, checking various bank branches within his
zone. [d. at 699. He saw the defendant in a parked automobile speaking to an-
other man in a car beside the defendant's car. [d. When the men noticed the police
officer's approach, they both started to exit in separate directions. [d. at 700. The
defendant made a motion as if he was either placing or moving something under
the seat of the car. [d. The defendant left the parking lot and drove in a westerly
direction. [d. The police officer followed and noticed that the defendant's license
plates had expired. [d. The officer displayed his red lights, sounded his siren, and
pulled the defendant over. [d. He then ordered the defendant out of his vehicle
two or three times. [d. The defendant was arrested for possession of a weapon
discovered in plain view on the floor of his vehicle. [d. The court ignored the
pretextual aspects although they were raised by the defendant. [d.
124. 416 Mich. 288, 330 N.W.2d 405 (1982).
125. [d. at 289, 330 NW.2d at 406.
126. [d.
127. [d. at 296, 330 N.W.2d at 407.
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driving with a suspended license was a pretext to search for
drugs.
Part of the difficulty may be that courts have trouble sup-
pressing evidence when the police officers have acted within the
letter of the law in conducting a search, but did so for the wrong
reason; namely, in pursuit of evidence. 128 Suppose, for example,
an officer suspects someone of being a narcotics peddler but
lacks probable cause to arrest for a drug offense. Suppose also
that the officer follows the suspect's automobile until the sus-
pect changes lanes without signaling. Now the officer has prob-
able cause to arrest for the traffic offense and does so. Courts
may be uncomfortable telling the officer that his belief that the
suspect is a drug dealer makes the otherwise perfectly legal
arrest for the traffic offense illega1.I29 Although almost all evi-
dence that is acquired in violation of the fourth amendment is
acquired in pursuit of evidence, articulating that goal as a bad
one may be troublesome.130
128. Haddad, Another Viewpoint, supra note 120, at 69l.
129. See, e.g., Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 253 (1960) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting), where Justice Brennan argued against relying on the motivation of
the arresting officer to determine the validity of an arrest and subsequent search:
Perhaps the question is how much basis the officers had to suspect the per-
son of crime; but it would appear a strange test as to whether a search
which turns up criminal evidence is unreasonable, that the search is more
justifiable the less there was antecedent probable cause to suspect the de-
fendant of crime.
Id.
130. This possibility was identified by Professor James Haddad, who has con-
sidered whether evidence discovered in a search that conforms to the letter of the
law but was pretextual in that it was conducted for the wrong reason ought to be
excluded. He concluded that there are four good reasons, including the textual
discussion, for rejecting the pretext approach, in addition to the difficulty of proof.
Haddad, Another Viewpoint, supra note 120, at 685-92. First is the difficulty of
knowing what the correct motive is in a particular case. In order to determine
whether a search was conducted with the proper motive, Professor Haddad points
out that all of the proper rationales underlying every fourth amendment doctrine
must be identified. But neither the Court nor the legislature necessarily makes
these rationales clear. By way of example he offers the search involved in United
States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983), in which marijuana was dis-
covered when officers boarded a ship in order to check its documents. To deter-
mine whether the discovery of the marijuana in this case was the result of a
pretextual search, it must be clear what the purposes of a document inspection are.
Professor Haddad thinks that assisting in the investigation of smuggling is a legit-
imate goal of document checks. Haddad, Another Viewpoint, supra note 120, at
676. As a result, he does not think the case is one involving pretextual search
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol17/iss3/16
1997] TRIBUTE TO BARBARA C. SALKEN 123
It is not clear whether the Supreme Court views searches
or seizures as illegal just because an officer's reasons for using a
specific fourth amendment power on a particular occasion are
not the reasons advanced by courts for approving the doctrine
which allows such fourth amendment activity.131 While there is
language in some older Supreme court decisions that supports
the idea that evidence acquired with an improper motive might
be suppressed, more recent decisions reject that idea. The case
most frequently cited for Supreme Court disapproval of pretext
is United States v. Lefkowitz,132 where the Court said in dicta
that "[a]n arrest may not be used as a pretext to search for evi-
dence."133 In United States v. Jones,134 the Court suppressed ev-
conduct. Id. at 681. In contrast, the leading proponent of excluding evidence on a
showing of pretext is Professor John Burkoff, who has argued that the Court ig-
nored a pretextual search in Villamonte-Marquez. Burkoff, Pretext, supra note
120, at 538. Professor Burkofl's argument assumes that the justification for docu-
ment checks does not include assisting in the investigation of smuggling. Haddad,
Another Viewpoint, supra note 120, at 676 n.172. The inability to ascertain every
rationale for many searches, particularly administrative searches, will make it im-
possible to use motivation to determine the claim of pretext.
Professor Haddad's second and third concerns are interrelated. In his view,
dir!,!ctly attacking pretextual searches will inhibit the development of the law and
will provide protection only for the suspected criminal, not the innocent citizen. Id.
at 687-89. According to Professor Haddad, when the Court considers whether the
police should have a power at all, it has always considered pretext as one of the
factors relevant to that determination. When the Court makes what Haddad calls
"hard choices," it factors in the risk that the government will abuse its power for
the wrong reasons. Haddad, Claims of Sham, supra note 120, at 212-14. For in-
stance, the Court has determined that police may not stop drivers indiscriminately
to check for license or registration violations. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648, 661 (1979) (police may not stop driver unless there is a reasonable suspicion
that driver is unlicensed or vehicle is unregistered). Haddad states that if the
Court had adopted the pretext approach, it might have allowed indiscriminate re-
gistration and license checks so long as a defendant could not establish that the
officer's true motive when he was stopped was to gather evidence of a crime rather
than to enforce the motor vehicle code. Haddad, Another Viewpoint, supra note
120, at 688. The result would have been a rule that offered much less fourth
amendment protection and that only protected those suspected ofcriminal activity.
Id. And, finally, Haddad points out that the pretext doctrine treats law-abiding
police as wrongdoers. His view of the textual discussion is that the police officer's
motive is irrelevant to the legality of his actions. Therefore, the pretextual activity
discussed in the text is not illegal. Id. at 691.
131. Compare Burkoff, Pretext, supra note 120, at 544-48 (Supreme Court
views pretextual searches as illegal) with Haddad, Another Viewpoint, supra note
120, at 653-73 (Supreme court has never viewed pretextual searches as illegal).
132. 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
133. Id. at 467.
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idence acquired during a search under a warrant that the
officers knew was invalid, notwithstanding the existence of
facts justifying entry to arrest the defendant that would have
permitted legal discovery of the evidence incident to that
arrest. 135 Justice Harlan concluded that "the record fails to sup-
port the theory now advanced by the Government. The testi-
mony of the federal officers makes clear beyond dispute that
their purpose in entering was to search for distilling equipment,
and not to arrest."136 In Jones, then, actual motive for the
search made the search illegal. 137
However, the Court's more recent decision in Scott v.
United States138 expressly rejects consideration of the officer's
motives for conducting a search if there is an objectively justifi-
able basis to support the search.139 "[T]he fact that the officer
does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the
reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's ac-
tion does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circum-
stances, viewed objectively, justify that action."140 Scott may
thus have closed the door on the pretext approach.141
134. 357 U.S. 493 (1958).
135. [d. at 499-500.
136. [d. at 500.
137. For further discussion of early Supreme Court cases considering police
motivation, see Burkoff, Bad Faith, supra note 120, at 75-81.
138. 436 U.S. 128 (1978). In Scott, government officials wiretapped a tele-
phone pursuant to a warrant. [d. at 131. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968 requires that wiretapping or electronic surveillance
be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not
otherwise subject to interception under that title. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1982) (cur-
rent version at 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (Supp. IV 1986». The officers admitted that
they made no efforts to comply with the minimization requirement, yet the Court
refused to suppress. 436 U.S. at 133. After evaluating the calls actually recorded,
the Court accepted the court of appeals' conclusion that the recordings were proper
since, in retrospect, it was reasonable for the officers to have recorded all of the
conversations that they did. [d. at 141. Since there were no conversations re-
corded that could not have been justified if the officers had actually minimized,
there was no constitutional violation.
139. 436 U.S. at 141.
140. [d. at 138.
141. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983), provides fur-
ther evidence of the Court's resistance to suppressing evidence discovered during a
search motivated for reasons that were not the ostensible justification for the
search. The Villamonte-Marquez Court upheld a document inspection of a sailboat
that uncovered narcotics in the face of defendant's assertion that the objective evi-
dence supported a claim of pretext. The Court said:
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As a practical matter, the individual-motivation approach
is particularly unsuccessful as a limitation on arbitrary power.
Not only is it difficult to prove, but it is also used so infrequently
that it cannot be considered a serious force in deterring police
conduct.142 Rarely will an officer be deterred from pretextual
arrests or searches because of the remote chance that a court
might find the activity illegal.
Respondents ... contend in the alternative that because the customs officers
were accompanied by a Louisiana state policeman, and were following an
informant's tip that a vessel in the ship channel was thought to be carrying
marihuana, they may not rely on the statute authorizing boarding for in-
spection of the vessel's documentation. This line of reasoning was rejected
in a similar situation in Scott v. United States, ... and we again reject it.
Acceptance of respondents' argument would lead to the incongruous result
criticized by Judge Campbell in his opinion in United States v. Arra ... :
'We would see little logic in sanctioning such examinations of ordinary, un-
suspect vessels but forbidding them in the case of suspected smugglers.'
[d. at 584 n.3 (citations omitted).
142. Even in the few jurisdictions that give lip service to prohibiting pretex-
tual police activity, suppression of evidence of criminal activity found in a pretex-
tual search is very rare. Compare State v. Florance, 270 Or. 169, 188, 527 P.2d
1202, 1211 (1974) ("We do not sanction ... pretext arrests.") with State v. Tucker,
286 Or. 485, 492-94, 595 P.2d 1364, 1368 (1979) (arrest to ascertain identity of
defendant after seeing defendant fail to stop his bicycle at stop sign was not
pretextual even though officer had real interest in defendant for other suspicious
conduct). After reviewing hundreds of cases arising from traffic arrests, with doz-
ens ofcredible claims ofpretext, only 10 states had suppressed evidence discovered
incident to arrest for a traffic offense on the basis ofpretext. See People v. Superior
Court, 7 Cal. 3d 186, 208, 496 P.2d 1205, 1221, 101 Cal. Rptr. 837, 853 (1972)
(evidence suppressed after stop for failure to use headlights at night); Wilhelm v.
State, 515 So. 2d 1343, 1344 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (evidence suppressed after
search of passenger compartment following stop for burned-out taillight); People v.
Thomas, 75 m. App. 3d 491, 493-94, 394 N.E.2d 624, 626 (1979) (evidence sup-
pressed after search of passenger compartment following traffic stop for failure to
signal); Lane v. Kentucky, 386 S.W.2d 743, 745-46 (Ky. 1964) (evidence suppressed
after search of trunk following stop for improper passing and arrest for not pos-
sessing valid license); People v. Seigel, 95 Mich. App. 594, 603, 291 N.W.2d 134,
139 (1980) (evidence suppressed where discovered during inventory search of car
after defendant arrested on traffic warrant and car impounded from private prop-
erty); State v. Hoven, 269 N.W.2d 849, 852 (Minn. 1978) (evidence acquired after
search based on arrest on old warrants for traffic offenses suppressed); State v.
Lahr, 172 Mont. 32, 35, 560 P.2d 527, 529 (1977) (evidence acquired after arrest
from reckless driving suppressed); State v. Hayburn, 171 N.J. Super. 390, 396, 409
A.2d 802, 805 (1979) (evidence found in trunk following stop for speeding sup-
pressed); People v. Grant, 126 Misc. 2d 18, 22, 480 N.Y.S.2d 1010, 1013 (Crim. Ct.
1984) (evidence suppressed after search of defendant's person following stop for
playing his car radio too loud); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 977 (Utah 1988) (evi-
dence discovered in search of trunk after stop for driving in left lane suppressed).
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B. Limiting the Scope of Searches Incident to Arrest for
Traffic Offenses
Another potential restraint on pretextual searches is to
limit the opportunity to conduct them. The court of appeals in
Robinson sought to address the problem by restricting the scope
of the search, thereby reducing its attractiveness as a pretext,
but the Supreme Court rejected this solution.143 The lower
court had held that the proper scope of a search incident to an
arrest for a traffic offense was a "frisk," since the only justifica-
tion for the search was discovery of hidden weapons.144 How-
ever, the Supreme Court reasoned that if the suspect was
armed the danger to the officer might be greater than the pro-
tection afforded by a frisk. 145 Unlike the brief encounter associ-
ated with investigatory street stops where frisks are
authorized, the traffic violator will be alone with the officer in
the close proximity of an automobile for the extended period
necessary to remove him to the stationhouse and complete the
booking process. Relying on statistics from two studies that
concluded that a significant number of police fatalities were the
result of encounters with people in automobiles, the Court re-
jected the lower court's assumption that persons arrested for
traffic offenses were less likely to possess dangerous weapons
than those arrested for other crimes. l46
143. See United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082 <D.C. Cir. 1972), rev'd, 414
U.S. 218 (1973). See supra notes 47-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the court of appeals and Supreme Court decisions in Robinson.
144. Robinson, 471 F.2d at 1095.
145. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234-35.
146. [d. at 234 n.5. The court observed that one study found that approxi-
mately 30% of all shootings of officers occur during traffic stops and that 11 of the
35 officer deaths reported by the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crinle
Reports for a three month period occurred in the traffic stop context. [d. A closer
look reveals that the three-month period referred to by the Court was a small slice
of time that had a skewed percentage of deaths. Looking at those same statistics
over a ten-year period indicated that the percentage of officer deaths occurring in
traffic stop contexts was under 10%. Schaffer, Harmon, & Helbush, Robinson at
Large in the Fifty States: A Continuation of the State Bills Debate in the Search
and Seizure Context, 5 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 1,52 (1974) (statistical analysis for
period from 1963 to 1973). It is also important to put this data in some perspec-
tive. When one considers how many traffic stops there are in comparison to other
kinds of police encounters, the relative safety of traffic stops becomes apparent.
For instance, during the same period as the quoted study, 26.5% of all officer
deaths occurred during apprehension or arrest of robbery or burglary suspects. [d.
In the year 1973 there were 561,530 arrests for robbery and burglary nationwide.
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If one accepts the basic assumption that officers are in in-
creased danger when they place a traffic offender in custody,
controlling potential pretextual searches by limiting the scope
of the permissible search presents practical difficulties.l47 It is
hard to define a search ofthe person that is greater than a frisk,
but that is still limited. l48 If a search is necessary to protect
against the possible use of a razor blade, a very thorough search
will be required. If such a thorough search is permitted, an of-
ficer who might be tempted to use the search authority permit-
ted by a traffic arrest for a wrong reason will have the
opportunity to do so.
Some states courts have rejected Robinson on state consti-
tutional grounds and have limited the permissible scope of a
search incident to an arrest for a traffic offense to a frisk. 149
Id. This compares to 1,897,288 traffic arrests in the State of California alone. Id.
Additionally, a detailed examination of all non-accidental officer deaths from 1960
to 1974 of the California Highway Patrol, the fifth largest police force in the nation
and the only force of its size devoted exclusively to traffic law enforcement, reveals
that all of the deaths involved firearms that even a limited frisk should have dis-
covered and only one involved an individual who was in custody at the time. Id. at
55-60. However, the majority of states and commentators that have considered
Robinson have accepted the Supreme Court's concern for police safety. See, e.g.,
Note, Search Incident to Arrest: United States v. Robinson-An Analytical View, 7
CONN. L. REV. 346, 371 (1974) (views the decision to permit a full search in Robin-
son to be sound as a matter of public policy); Note, Search ofa Motor Vehicle Inci-
dent to a Traffic Arrest: The Outlook After Robinson and Gustafson, 36 OHIO ST.
L.J. 97, 113 (1975) [hereinafter Note, Search of a Motor Vehicle] (argues against
extending search to automobile; no consideration of propriety of search of arrestee
authorized in Robinson). Of the more than forty law review articles that have been
written about Robinson, few have argued for a limitation on the scope of the
search. But see Marks, United States v. Robinson and Gustafson v. Florida: Ex-
tending the Boundaries in Searches and Seizure, 1975 DET. C.L. REV. 211 (would
restrict scope of search to that which is' necessary to discover weapons, but admits
defining permissible extent of such searches would be difficult); Comment, Search
Incident to Custodial Arrest for Traffic Violation, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 401, 407-08
(1974) (suggests frisk is sufficient to protect officers' safety if officers are also per-
mitted to remove and detain other items that may contain weapons but are not
guns or knives).
147. The scope of the search could be limited to a search of person. There is
no reason why the search ofthe passenger compartment of the car must be permit-
ted if the only issue is the safety of the officer. Note, Search 0 ofa Motor Vehicle,
supra note 146, at 113.
148. LaFave, supra note 17, at 155-56.
149. A few states have adopted provisions that limit the purpose of a search to
the traditional Chimel justifications. For example, a Massachusetts statute
provides:
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Alaska,150 California,151 Hawaii,152 Massachusetts,153 Oregon,154
and Washington155 have done so without any reported increase
in officer fatalities. Nonetheless, the overwhelming acceptance
of the need for extensive searches to protect police officers
makes it unlikely that either the Supreme Court or the thirty-
five states156 that have affirmatively accepted the rationale of
A search conducted incident to an arrest may be made only for the pur-
poses of seizing fruits, instrumentalities, contraband and other evidence of
the crime for which the arrest has been made, in order to prevent its de-
struction or concealment; and removing any weapons that the arrestee
might use to resist or effect his escape. Property seized as a result of a
search in violation of the provisions of this paragraph shall not be admissi-
ble in evidence in criminal proceedings.
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 276, § 1 (West Supp. 1988). This statute was adopted in
direct response to the Robinson decision. Commonwealth v. Wilson, 389 Mass.
115, 118-19,448 N.E.2d 1130, 1132 (1983). See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2303
(1985) (search without warrant incident to arrest may be made to seize fruits of
crime, means, weapons, or other evidence of crime); RAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2501
(Vernon 1981) (search without warrant may be made to protect officer from attack,
prevent person from escaping, or to discover fruits of crime); ARK. R. CRIM. P.
12.4(a) (if arrestee in vehicle or in vicinity of vehicle apparently in arrestee's con-
trol at time of arrest, officer may search vehicle for things connected with offense
for which arrest made that officer reasonably believes are present).
150. Zehrung v. State, 569 P.2d 189, 199-200 (Alaska 1977) (warrantless
search incident to arrest must be limited to search for weapons), opinion modified
on rehearing, 573 P.2d 858 (Alaska 1978) (Zehrung rule need not be followed if
exigent circumstances require otherwise).
151. People v. Superior Court (Simon), 7 Cal. 3d 186, 209, 496 P.2d 1205,
1222, 101 Cal. Rptr. 837, 854 (1972) (when arrested for traffic violation, arrestee
may not be searched but must be transported directly to magistrate). Accord Peo-
ple v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975).
152. State v. Enos, 720 P.2d 1012,1014 (Haw. 1986) (scope of search is limited
to that which is reasonably necessary to discover fruits or instruments of crime or
to protect officer from attacks).
153. Commonwealth v. Wilson, 389 Mass. 115, 118, 448 N.E.2d 1130, 1132
(1983) (searches incident to arrest can only be made for purpose of seizing evidence
of crime or to remove weapons from arrestee).
154. State v. Lowry, 295 Or. 337, 348, 667 P.2d 996, 1003 (1983) (seizures
must be reasonably related to probable cause for arrest).
155. State v. Hehman, 90 Wash. 2d 45,51,578 P.2d 527,529 (1978) (search of
defendant because of minor traffic violation improper).
156. At least 34 states either accept Robinson expressly or admit evidence
seized incident to an arrest for a traffic offense. The following 25 state courts have
expressly accepted Robinson: Daniels v. State, 416 So. 2d 760, 762 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1982); State v. Cooper, 130 Ariz. 348, 636 P.2d 126, 128 (1981); People v.
Bischofberger, 724 P.2d 660, 662 (Colo. 1986); State v. Christian, 189 Conn. 35,
454 A.2d 262, 265 (1983); Traylor v. State, 458 A.2d 1170, 1174 (Del. Super. Ct.
1983); State v. Williams, 516 So. 2d 1081, 1083 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Whis-
nant v. State, 185 Ga. App. 51,53,363 S.E.2d 341,342 (1987); Frasier v. State, 312
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Robinson will reverse themselves soon. Like suppressing evi-
dence on a showing of pretext, reducing the opportunity for
pretextual searches by limiting the scope of such a search does
not appear to have much chance of success.
C. Excluding Evidence Other than Weapons Found During a
Search Incident to a Traffic Arrest
LaFave found the two remaining approaches to prevent
pretext searches to be more useful. He suggested "remov[ing]
the temptation to engage in pretext arrests by broadening the
exclusionary rule so as to exclude from evidence anything but a
weapon found in a search incident to an arrest for a [traffic vio-
lation]."157 If the goal of the police in conducting the search is to
N.E.2d 77, 80 (Ind. 1974); State v. Farrell, 242 N.W.2d 327, 329 (Iowa 1976); State
v. Press, 9 Kan. App. 2d 589,593,685 P.2d 887,890 (1984); State v. Guidry, 442
So. 2d 1251, 1253 (La. Ct. App. 1983); Parker v. State, 66 Md. App. 1,3-4,502 A.2d
510,512 (1986); People v. Jackson, 123 Mich. App. 423, 424, 332 N.W.2d 564, 565
(1983); State v. Martin, 253 NW.2d 404, 405 (Min.. 1977); State v. Moomey, 581
S.W.2d 899, 901 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); State v. Jetty, 176 Mont. 519, 520, 579 P.2d
1228,1229 (1978); Carstairs v. State, 94 Nev. 125, 126,575 P.2d 977, 978 (1978);
State v. Miskolczi, 123 N.H. 626, 627, 465 A.2d 919, 921 (1983); State v. Evans,
181 N.J. Super. 445, 457,438 A.2d 340, 343 (App. Div. 1981); State v. Rice, 69 Ohio
St. 2d 422, 428, 433 N.E.2d 175, 180 (1982); King v. State, 562 P.2d 902, 903 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1977); Commonwealth v. Henry, 358 Pa. Super. 306,307,517 A.2d 559,
561 (1986); State v. LohIT, 87 S.D. 693, 695, 214 N.W.2d 80, 82 (1974); Layton v.
State, 738 SW.2d 763, 766 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987); State v. King, 142 Wis. 2d 207,
208,418 N.W.2d 11, 12-13 (1987). The following nine state courts have admitted
evidence seized in a Robinson situation without referring directly to Robinson:
Williams v. State, 23 Ark. App. 121, 122, 743 S.W.2d 402, 403 (1988) (search of
person incident to arrest for traffic offense revealing drugs); Commonwealth v.
Ramsey, 744 S.W.2d 418,418 (Ky. 1987) (arrest for DWI justified search of person
and passenger compartment of car); State v. Laplante, 534 A.2d 959, 959 (Me.
1987) (search of person and car incident to traffic arrest); State v. Roth, 213 Neb.
900,901,331 N.W.2d 819, 820 (1983) (search of person and truck incident to traffic
arrest); State v. Cooper, 304 N.C. 701, 702, 286 S.E.2d 102, 103 (1982) (search of
passenger in car incident to DWI arrest); State v. Hensel, 417 N.W.2d 849,851
(N.D. 1988) (search of passenger compartment incident to arrest for DWI); Tennes-
see v. Halcomb (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 4, 1985) (LEXIS, States library, Tenn file)
(search of defendant's person and locked glove compartment incident to arrest for
traffic offense); State v. KKC., 636 P.2d 1044, 1045 (Utah 1981) (search of passen-
ger compartment of car for arrest for open alcohol container).
157. LaFave, supra note 17, at 156. Following is an example of how the use-
exclusion approach might work. A police officer stops a vehicle for going through a
red light. He places the driver under arrest and then searches the driver, discover-
ing cocaine in his shirt pocket and a gun in his jacket pocket. The gun is admissi-
ble because the justification for the power to conduct this search is to discover
weapons, but the discovered cocaine is not. Two other commentators support this
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discover evidence for criminal prosecution, this expansion of the
exclusionary rule completely eliminates the incentive to engage
in pretextual searches since any such evidence discovered can-
not be used. LaFave proposed this approach as an especially
effective deterrent even though it would sometimes result in the
suppression of evidence in cases in which there was no police
wrongdoing.158
Among the advantages of this approach are that it permits
evaluation of police conduct without examining the officer's mo-
tive, an evaluation that is fraught with difficulties,159 and that it
does not compromise the officer's safety, as restricting the scope
of the search might.160 As long as a search is within the Robin-
son / Belton scope rule, the officers would be free to satisfy them-
selves as to their safety. The obvious disadvantage of this
approach is that it will frequently result in the suppression of
evidence when the officers have acted properly.I61
approach. The first is Professor Anthony Amsterdam, who discussed it in relation
to another but similar practice. Amsterdam, supra note 70, at 434-39. In his su-
perb Holmes Lectures, delivered just six weeks after Robinson was decided, Profes-
sor Amsterdam suggested that such an expansion of the exclusionary rule would
be appropriate to regulate police conduct in a wide variety ofcircumstances, partic-
ularly stop and frisk, but applicable whenever police engage in conduct: (1) that
intrudes on a citizen's fourth amendment interests; (2) that is justified by a partic-
ular governmental need, i.e., protection of police officers; and (3) where the power
may in fact be exercised for some other purpose. Id. at 434. Also supporting this
approach is Professor James B. White who, in the same issue of the Supreme Court
Review in which Professor LaFave articulated his proposal, suggested the same
solution. He proposed that "[t]he officer should have an automatic authority to
make a full arms search incident to an arrest, even though this authority is incon-
sistent with the principle of particular justification, but nothing found in such a
search should be admissible in a criminal trial of the person arrested." White,
supra note 106, at 209.
158. LaFave, supra note 17, at 156-57.
159. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 143-56 and accompanying text.
161. To the supporters of this approach, however, this difficulty is outweighed
because it would be consistent with the view of the exclusionary rule as "regulatory
rather than atomistic." This phrase was first used by Professor Amsterdam, an-
other supporter of the use-exclusion approach. See Amsterdam. supra note 70, at
367-72. Such a view recognizes that the exclusionary rule is a general deterrent
device rather than "a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved."
LaFave, supra note 17, at 157 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,
348 (1974». Although the court has not accepted this position and operates in an
inconsistent fashion in this regard, compare Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348 (exclusion-
ary rule is judicially created remedy designed to safeguard fourth amendment
rights generally through its deterrent effect rather than personal constitutional
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Professor James Haddad is the chief critic of this expansion
of the exclusionary rule, which he labels the use-exclusion ap-
proach.162 His opposition rests on three grounds. First, he ob-
jects to the "enormous" costs of such an approach, the extent of
which will depend entirely on chance. 163 For instance, if a police
officer stops a car for speeding and, as a result of a search inci-
dent to that arrest discovered marijuana, some might argue
that the costs of suppressing that evidence are slight. However,
if a bloody shirt or other evidence of a murder is found, that
evidence too would be inadmissible. If, in addition, that evi-
dence was the first link between the car owner and the murder,
the derivative evidence rules might bar any prosecution at
all. 164 Whatever effect the exclusion of this evidence might have
right of party aggrieved) with Rakas v.Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 (1978) (proper to
permit only defendants whose fourth amendment rights have been violated to ben-
efit from rule's protections), both Professors LaFave and Amsterdam have argued
for its acceptance. See Amsterdam, supra note 70, at 367-72; LaFave, supra note
17, at 156-57. Under the regulatory view,
'[t]here is no necessary relationship between the violation of an individual's
fourth amendment rights and the exclusion of evidence;' rather, the 'exclu-
sionary rule is simply a tool to be employed in whatever manner is neces-
sary to achieve the amendment's regulatory objective by reducing
undesirable incentives to unconstitutional searches and seizure.'
LaFave, supra note 17, at 157 (quoting Amsterdam, supra note 70, at 437-39). If
one accepts this view, "there is much to be said for excluding evidence other than
weapons obtained incident to a traffic arrest, given the inherent difficulties in sep-
arating those searches which are in fact laWful from those which are not." Id.
162. Haddad, Claims of Sham, supra note 120, at 206-10.
163. Id. at 207.
164. Id. Traditionally, the Supreme Court has barred not only the evidence
that was the direct product of the illegal police activity but any evidence that was
discovered by exploitation of the initial illegality. See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). The fruits doctrine has been held to exclude a confes-
sion that was the product of an illegal arrest, and the discovery of contraband that
was the product of the confession that was the product of the illegal arrest. Id. at
487-88. However, recent decisions' of the Supreme Court have modified this princi-
ple somewhat. The Court has accepted three doctrines: attenuation, see, e.g.,
United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 279 (1978) (evidence from live witness
discovered as direct product of police misconduct admissible); independent source,
see, e.g., Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 799 (1984) (evidence discovered
pursuant to search warrant issued after police illegally entered premises but based
on probable cause not derived from illegal entry admissible); and inevitable discov-
ery, see, e.g., Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 448 (1984) (evidence discovered as
product of illegally obtained admission admissible because it would have been in-
evitably discovered). These doctrines greatly limit the derivation evidence rules.
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on regulating police officers generally, to many it does not out-
weigh the cost of nonprosecution of a murderer.165
Second, Professor Haddad thinks that "the use-exclusion
approach would breed disrespect for the judiciary and would not
survive a brief experimental life."166 He believes that public
support for the exclusionary rule depends, to some extent at
least, on using it only to punish an officer for wrongdoing. Even
courts accept this premise. "[Rlight or wrong, [some courts]
have been emotionally unable" to exclude evidence that was the
product of illegal conduct by an officer not associated with the
subject prosecution but that was, nonetheless, the product of il-
legal activity,167 Haddad thinks it is extremely unlikely that a
rule that excludes evidence when there was no misconduct can
survive.168
Finally, Professor Haddad suggests that use-exclusion
would radically modify the plain-view doctrine,169 This fourth
amendment principle permits police officers to seize evidence
without a warrant when they have discovered it inadvertently
and without misconduct.17o The classic example of plain view is
when officers discover contraband while executing a valid war-
rant for some other evidence. The doctrine permits them to
seize the contraband and use it as evidence. The use-exclusion
doctrine is clearly inconsistent with this well-founded principle.
Officers looking for a weapon in a search incident to an arrest
for a traffic violation would be precluded from using what they
had discovered in plain view. Professor Haddad fears that
adoption of use-exclusion would necessarily affect any fourth
amendment doctrine that permits officers to seize evidence that
was uncovered while pursuing an unrelated matter,171
165. See Haddad, Claims of Sham, supra note 120, at 207-08.
166. Id. at 207.
167. Id. at 209.
168. Id. at 208-09.
169. Id. at 210.
170. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971) (plain view allows
admission of evidence found inadvertently if officer had prior justification for
intrusion).
171. Haddad, Claims ofSham, supra note 120, at 210. As examples, Haddad
offers search incident to an arrest for a crime and inventory searches. In the for-
mer, police are traditionally permitted to search for weapons and to prevent the
destruction of evidence of the crime for which the suspect is arrested. If, during
the course of that search, evidence of other crimes is discovered it is admissible.
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The use-exclusion approach has received no support from
either the Supreme Court or the states. And while its support-
ers are right that it eliminates any incentive to arrest a traffic
violator to discover evidence for prosecution of other crimes, it
would have no effect on decisions to arrest for other arbitrary
and impermissible reasons. Given public sentiment on the use
of the exclusionary rule in any context, further expansion of the
rule would require a compelling reason and the absence of other
alternatives. But there is another alternative; one that carries
all of the benefits and none of the costs.
D. Limiting the Power to Arrest for Minor Traffic Offenses
[I]t may well be that the overriding question presented by Robin-
son is not what degree of search may be conducted incident to
arrest, but rather when an arrest itself is warranted so as to call
for a full protective search. That is, if a full search for self~protec­
tion is necessary only in the event of arrest, then is not such a
search unnecessary if the antecedent arrest was unnecessary?172
Professor LaFave concludes that the easiest and most efficient
control "in an area with a high potential for undetectable
abuse"173 is to prohibit the arrest itself. Without the arrest
there is simply no need to search. LaFave does not develop this
solution in his Robinson Dilemma article beyond suggesting
that either legislative or police regulations could define catego-
ries that justify arrest or preclude it.l74 He has, however, ex-
panded on his theory in more recent writings.175
LaFave views a bad faith search as a search that would not
have been made but for the underlying intent or motivation of
Use-exclusion would certainly alter this rule. "[U]nder the use-exclusion doctrine,
only a weapon or evidence of this crime could be admitted. The cost of a search
incident to arrest would be creation of an 'immunity shield' for unrelated evidence
discovered in such a search and for any evidence derived through such discovery."
[d. Likewise, inventory searches are conducted to prevent the theft of articles in
automobiles by employees of the police or the bailee and to prevent false claims of
loss by the owner. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976). Use-
exclusion would prohibit the police from using anything discovered during these
searches as evidence in a criminal trial.
172. LaFave, supra note 17, at 158.
173. [d. at 162.
174. [d. at 160-6l.
175. See 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § l.4(e) (2d ed. 1987); 2 W.
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 5.2(g) (2d ed. 1987).
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the police. However, he does not think it is possible or profita-
ble to attempt to identify the motive of the officer.
The proper basis of concern is not with why the officer deviated
from the usual practice in this case but simply that he did devi-
ate. It is the fact of the departure from the accepted way of han-
dling such cases which makes the officer's conduct arbitrary, and
it is the arbitrariness which in this context constitutes the Fourth
Amendment violation.176
When the arrest of X for a traffic offense would have occurred
even without the officer's impermissible underlying intent or
motivation, there is no conduct that ought to have been de-
terred. LaFave reads the fourth amendment as requiring legis-
latures or administrators to establish standard procedures in
areas such as traffic arrests and then to suppress evidence
whenever an officer operates outside of the procedures, regard-
less of his or her motivation for doing SO.177 LaFave's solution
departs from traditional fourth amendment analysis in that the
Court will not make a determination, on a case-by-case basis, as
to the reasonableness of an arrest. He would have the Court
delegate to the police or the legislature the responsibility for de-
termining whether it is reasonable to arrest for a particular of-
fense when they establish the appropriate regulations. 178 Since
a search or arrest conducted pursuant to standardized proce-
dures would not be indiscriminate or arbitrary, the Court would
uphold it against constitutional challenge.
The difficulty with this solution is that police procedures
frequently do not sufficiently restrict police discretion. In the
few circumstances where the Court does require standardized
procedures, it has not evaluated whether the procedures used
actually limited police discretion. Colorado v. Bertine179 exem-
plifies the ineffectiveness of limiting arbitrary searches by re-
quiring police regulations. Bertine involved the legality of an
inventory search of an automobile, one of the areas in which the
legality of the search depends on adherence to standardized
procedures. Bertine was arrested for driving under the influ-
176. 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 175, § 1.4(e), at 94.
177. [d. at 96.
178. 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 175, § 5.2(g), at 463.
179. 479 U.S. 367 (1987).
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ence of alcohol. 180 After his arrest, but before his vehicle was
impounded, officers made an inventory search of his vehicle.18l
The officer searched a backpack found behind the front seat of
the vehicle, discovering drugs in metal canisters inside a nylon
bag. 182 Although there was some evidence that the inventory
search did not follow prescribed procedures,183 the bigger prob-
lem was presented by the absence of limitations on the police
officer's discretion to impound the vehicle, thereby acquiring the
authority to search it, or to park and lock it in a public parking
lot, preserving Bertine's privacy interests in his vehicle and its
contents.184 The officer testified that Colorado law gives the of-
ficer complete discretion as to whether to impound.185 Such un-
bridled discretion completely defeats the effectiveness of
regulations in prohibiting arbitrary decisions to impound. To
work as a limitation on the decision to impound, regulations
must limit the exercise of discretion. But the Court was unwill-
ing to evaluate administrative regulations in this fashion. "We
conclude that here ... reasonable police regulations relating to
inventory procedures administered in good faith satisfy the
Fourth Amendment, even though courts might as a matter of
hindsight be able to devise equally reasonable rules requiring a
different procedure."186 As in the decision to impound, the deci-
sion to arrest a traffic offender carries with it the authority to
search. That standardized procedures exist for either action
does not prohibit the exercise of either power as a pretext to
search. If LaFave's solution is to work, courts must be willing
to evaluate the particular regulations under the fourth amend-
ment, and to require that the regulations effectively restrict the
officer's exercise of discretion. In Bertine, the Court declined
that role.
180. Id. at 368.
181. Id. at 368-69.
182. Id. at 369.
183. Id. The inventory was at best slipshod. Id. The dissenters noted that
the officer failed to list $150 in cash found in Bertine's wallet, $210 found in a
sealed envelope, and other items of value found in the van. Id. at 383 (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 370.
185. Id. at 381.
186. Id. at 374.
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Nonetheless, LaFave is correct in stating that limiting the
power to arrest for a traffic offense is the best solution for
prohibiting pretextual searches. In the fifteen years since
Robinson was decided, however, very few legislatures have fol-
lowed this route. 1S7 Twenty-eight of the fifty states have no lim-
itations on police discretion to arrest for a traffic offense.1ss In
187. The failure of legislatures to develop rules regulating police conduct in
the area of searches and seizures has been noted previously by commentators, in-
cluding Professor LaFave. LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through the Ex-
clusionary Rule (pt. 2), 30 Mo. L. REV. 391, 556, 568-70 (1965), See also
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
REPORT: THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 94 (1967) (few legislatures
have defined how and under what conditions certain police practices are to be
used); Amsterdam, supra note 70, at 378-79 (political suicide for legislatures to
restrict police).
188. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3883 (1985) (warrantless arrest allowed when
officer has probable cause to believe misdemeanor committed in his presence and
probable cause to believe person to be arrested committed the offense); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 16-81-106 (1987) (warrantless arrest allowed when officer has probable
cause to believe misdemeanor committed in his presence and probable cause to
believe person to be arrested committed the offense); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-1f(a)
(1985) (officer may arrest for any offense when person taken while committing of-
fense and arrest made upon speedy information of others); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21,
§ 701 (1985) (warrantless arrest allowed when officer has probable cause to believe
violation committed in his presence and probable cause to believe person to be
arrested committed the offense); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 901.15 (West 1985) (warrant-
less arrest allowed if committed misdemeanor or violated ordinance in presence of
officer); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-4-23 (1982) (officer has discretion to give citation
rather than arrest); HAw. REV. STAT. § 803-5 (1985) (officer may without warrant
arrest any person when officer has probable cause to believe person has committed
any offense); IDAHO CODE § 19-603 (Supp. 1988) (warrantless arrest allowed if com-
mitted misdemeanor or violated ordinance in presence of officer); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, para. 107-2 (Supp. 1988) (warrantless arrest allowed when officer has prob-
able cause to believe misdemeanor committed in his presence and probable cause
to believe person to be arrested committed the offense); IOWA CODE § 804.7 (1979)
(officer can arrest ifoffense committed in officer's presence of officer has reasonable
grounds to believe public offense committed); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-2104, 8-2105, 8-
2106, 8-2109 (1982 & Supp. 1985) (officer has discretion to arrest or issue citation
for misdemeanor motor vehicle offenses); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 704 (1964)
(officer shall arrest and detain persons found violating any law, ordinance, or by-
law, until legal warrant can be obtained); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. §§ 764.9c(1),
.15(a) (West Supp. 1988) (warrantless arrest allowed ifcommitted misdemeanor or
violated ordinance in presence of officer, and officer has discretion to take into cus-
tody or issue citation); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-3-7 (Supp. 1988) (warrantless arrest
allowed if committed misdemeanor or violated ordinance in presence of officer);
Mo. ANN. STAT § 544.216 (Vernon 1986) (arrest if officer sees person committing
violation or has reasonable grounds to believe person violated any law); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-6-401[l(d)] (1987) (arrest if officer has reasonable grounds that
person committed offense and existing circumstances require immediate arrest);
40http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol17/iss3/16
1997] TRIBUTE TO BARBARA C. SALKEN 137
these states, a police officer can decide to arrest for the most
minor offense. In the twenty-two states that have legislative
limitations, many either retain provisions that give the officer
broad discretion or only require the issuance of a citation in a
small class of offenses,189 leaving a great deal of room for police
NEV. REV. STAT. § 484.795 (1987) (officer may arrest at his discretion); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 594:10(l)(a), :14 (1986) (officer may arrest without warrant upon
probable cause for misdemeanor or violation committed in officer's presence, or
may issue summons in lieu of arrest); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:5-25 (West Supp. 1988)
(officer may arrest without warrant any person committing motor vehicle violation
in officer's presence, and may issue summons instead of arresting); N.Y. CRIM.
FRoc. LAw § 140.10(l)(a) (McKinney 1986) (warrantless arrest allowed when of-
ficer has probable cause to believe misdemeanor committed in his presence and
probable cause to believe person to be arrested committed the offense); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 20-183 (1983) (officer has power to arrest on sight any person found violat-
ing motor vehicle laws); id. § 150.20 (permits officer to issue a summons but does
not require it); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.03 (Baldwin 1988) (warrantless arrest
allowed if committed misdemeanor or violated ordinance in presence of officer); 75
PA. CONS. STAT. § 6304 (1987) (state police officer may arrest anyone, and any
other police officer may arrest nonresident, for any violation committed in pres-
ence); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-7-3 (1981) (warrantless arrest allowed when officer has
probable cause to believe misdemeanor committed in his presence and probable
cause to believe person to be arrested committed the offense); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 6701d, § 153 (Vernon 1977) (any officer can arrest without warrant any
person found violating any provision ofmotor vehicle act); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-
2 (1982) (arrest if officer has reasonable cause to believe offense was committed
and reasonable cause for believing person may flee, destroy evidence, or injure an-
other); W. VA. CODE § 15-5-18 (1985) (warrantless arrest allowed ifcommitted mis-
demeanor or violated ordinance in presence of officer); Wyo. STAT. § 31-5-1204 to-
1205 (1984) (officer may arrest upon reasonable and probable grounds to believe
person has committed specified motor vehicle violations, including reckless
driving).
189. The states that require the issuance of a citation in lieu of arrest in some
circumstances are: ALA. CODE § 32-1-4 (1983) (when any person arrested for motor
vehicle misdemeanor, officer shall release upon written bond to appear, unless of-
ficer has good cause to believe person has committed any felony, or person charged
with offense resulting in injury or death or offense of DWD; ALASKA STAT.
§ 12.25.180(b) (1984) (when person stopped for infraction or violation, person shall
be issued citation unless satisfactory evidence of identity not furnished or person
refuses to accept citation or give written promise to appear); CAL. VEHICLE CODE
§ 40504 <West 1985) (officer must deliver copy of notice to appear to arrested per-
son); COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-150l(4)(a) (1988) (officer must deliver copy of notice
to appear to arrested person); IND. CODE ANN. § 9-4-1-131 (Burns 1987) (person
arrested for motor vehicle misdemeanor must be released on written promise to
appear, unless charged with offense contributing to injury or death, offense of
DWI, failure to stop after accident causing injury or damage, or driving while li-
cense suspended or revoked); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.015(2) (Baldwin 1985) (of-
ficer must issue citation rather than arrest for motor vehicle violations, except for
certain violations, for example, failure to drive in careful manner or DWI); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 32:391 (West 1988) (officer shall release on promise to appear
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person arrested for motor vehicle violation, except in certain situations, for exam-
ple, officer has good cause to believe person committed any felony or misde-
meanor); MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 26-202(a)(2) (1987) (officer may arrest without
warrant for any traffic law violation ifviolation committed within officer's presence
and person does not furnish satisfactory proof of identity or officer reasonably be-
lieves traffic citation will be ignored); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 21 (West
Supp. 1988) (officer may arrest without warrant and keep in custody for not longer
than 24 hours, persons who commit certain motor vehicle offenses); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 169.91 (West 1986 & Supp. 1989) (officer shall issue written notice to ap-
pear to person arrested for motor vehicle violation, but must bring person before
judge in certain instances, for example, when there is reasonable cause to believe
person will leave state); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-427, -432, -435, 39-6,105 (1984-
1985) (officer shall issue citation for traffic infraction, but can arrest and detain
person if, for example, officer believes person will not appear, or will cause immedi-
ate harm if not detained, or person has no ties to community); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 66-8-123 (1987) (officer must issue summons with five exceptions); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 39-07-07 (1987) (requires the issuance of a summons with some excep-
tions); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1ll5.HA) (West Supp. 1989) (officer shall release
on personal recognizance person arrested solely for misdemeanor traffic violation
if, among other requirements, officer is satisfied as to person's identity); OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 133.310(1), 810.410, 811.140 (1987) (officer shall not arrest person who
commits traffic infraction and may issue citation instead; however, officer can
arrest person for specified offense, for example, reckless driving); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 56-25-30 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1988) (officer may release person on own recogni-
zance who has accepted traffic citation issued by officer); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN.
§ 32-33-2 (1984) (citation required whenever violation punishable as misde-
meanor); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-ll8(b)(1) (Supp. 1988) (use citation in lieu of
continued custody); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-178 (Supp. 1988) (officer shall release
upon written promise to appear person committing misdemeanor traffic offense,
except in certain specified instances); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.63.020 (1989)
(traffic infractions are not designated as criminaJ offenses, except for certain speci-
fied violations, for example, negligent or reckless driving); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 345.22 to .23 (West Supp. 1988) (officer shall release traffic regulation violator
arrested without warrant under certain conditions, otherwise officer has discretion
to take violator into custody); VT. R. CRIM. P. 3(a), (c) (officer who has grounds to
arrest person for misdemeanor shall issue citation in lieu of arrest, but may arrest
in certain specified instances, for example, ifperson fails to furnish adequate proof
of identity, arrest is necessary to obtain nontestimonial evidence, or person has
insufficient ties to community). For examples of statutes that provide ample op-
portunity for abuses despite apparent limits on the ability of an officer to arrest
and take into custody, see, e.g., Kentucky, which permits warrantless arrest for
only a small class of offenses, Ky. REV. STAT. § 431.005 (Baldwin 1985), but in-
cludes within that class anyone who fails to operate his or her vehicle in a "careful
manner, with regard for the safety and convenience of pedestrians and other vehi-
cles upon the highway," id. § 189.290(1) (Baldwin 1982); Nebraska, which requires
that anyone charged with a traffic infraction be issued a citation, NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 39-6,105 (1984), but then permits arrest if"the officer has reasonable grounds to
believe that (I) the accused will refuse to respond to the citation, (2) such custody
is necessary to protect the accused or others when his continued liberty would con-
stitute a risk of immediate harm, (3) such action is necessary in order to carry out
legitimate investigative functions, (4) the accused has no ties to the jurisdiction
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pretext.190 There is no evidence that police administrators have
been any more forthcoming. 191 But controlling the power to
arrest need not be relegated to legislatures or administrators. 192
The next section will show how the fourth amendment itself
gives rise to a rule prohibiting arrests for minor traffic
violations.
III. The Case for Constitutional Restrictions on the Power to
Arrest for Traffic Offenses
The best and easiest solution to the pretext problem is to
deny police officers the power to arrest for the ordinary traffic
offense and to require that they issue a citation instead. If the
police do not have the power to arrest, they do not need the
power to search. If they do not have the power to arrest, there
is no danger that they will arrest for the wrong reasons. Addi-
tionally, denying the power to arrest not only provides the
bright-line standard that the Supreme Court and others have
reasonably sufficient to assure his appearance, or (5) the accused has previously
failed to appear in response to a citation," id. § 29-427 (1985); and Tennessee,
which has a long list of exceptions, including the "reasonable likelihood that the
offense would continue or resume," TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-118(c)(2) (Supp. 1988),
and two interesting variations, one which permits arrest in lieu of a citation when
"[t]he prosecution of the offense for which there person was arrested, or of another
offense, would thereby be jeopardized," id. § 40-7-118(c)(4) (Supp. 1988), and an-
other which explicitly permits an officer to conduct the same search he would have
been permitted had he arrested the accused, id. § 40-7-118(h) (Supp. 1988).
190. Texas, for example, only requires the issuance of a summons in lieu of
arrest for speeding. TEX. REV. Cry. STAT. ANN. art. 6701d, § 148(d) (Vernon 1977).
191. I have made no effort to systematically exanline whether police depart-
ments across the country have developed procedures that limit the officer's discre-
tion to arrest. However, I have not found a single case in which a court has
considered either adherence to or the presence of procedures as a factor in evaluat-
ing police conduct in this area. In an admittedly unscientific survey of local police
departments in New York, I discovered that there were absolutely no procedures
in effect. I inquired of the New York State Police, the Westchester County Police,
the Town of Greenburgh Police, the City of New Rochelle Police, and the Village of
Monticello Police. In each instance I was told that there were no written proce-
dures to guide officers in making the decision to arrest for a traffic offense.
192. Some state courts have suppressed evidence when police officers have
arrested a traffic offender and the court has viewed the arrest as either in contra-
vention of a state statute or state policy. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Collini, 264
Pa. Super. 36, 42-43, 398 A.2d 1044, 1047 (1979) (state code generally requires
citations for traffic offenses; searches of the person prohibited for all offenses ex-
cept DWI or nonresidents); State v. Breaux, 329 So. 2d 696, 699 (La. 1976) (custody
is not our customary practice).
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felt so necessary to implement functional fourth amendment
doctrine,193 but also protects fourth amendment interests with-
out subjecting police to unnecessary danger. Nonetheless,
twenty-five years after Robinson, there is no jurisdiction that
prohibits all arrests for traffic offenses and few that substan-
tially limit them.194
Perhaps the solution to the problem created by Robinson
lies in the fourth amendment itself, which guarantees freedom
from unreasonable searches and seizures.195 Although the
Supreme Court has never considered whether a custodial arrest
for a minor traffic offense is a violation of the fourth amend-
ment, it has held that "a warrantless arrest of a person is a spe-
cies of seizure required by the Amendment to be reasonable."196
And at least one Justice has thought custodial arrest for a traf-
fic offense to be unreasonable under the fourth amendment.
Justice Stewart, concurring in United States v. Gustafson,197
stated: "[i]t seems to me that a persuasive claim might have
been made in this case that the custodial arrest of the petitioner
[Gustafson] for a minor traffic offense violated his rights under
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. But no such claim
has been made."198 This section examines the claim that Gus-
tafson failed to raise.
Three questions are relevant as to whether a particular
practice violates the fourth amendment: whether the fourth
amendment was designed to prevent the government activity
complained of,199 whether the practice complained of was ac-
cepted under the common law,20o and whether the government's
interest requiring the intrusion outweighs the individual's pri-
193. See supra note 107 and accompanying text for a discussion of Professor
LaFave's advocacy of standardized procedures to limit police searches.
194. See supra notes 188-89 for statutes defining power to arrest for traffic
offenses.
195. See supra note 1 for the text of the fourth amendment.
196. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980).
197. 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
198. [d. at 266-67 (Stewart, J., concurring).
199. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583-90 (1980) (discussion of
immediate evils that motivated adoption of fourth amendment).
200. See, e.g., id. at 591-98 (examination of common law understanding of an
officer's authority to arrest); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418-22 (1976)
(examination of cases construing the fourth amendment to allow peace officer to
arrest without a warrant).
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vacy interest.201 The subsections following propose that custo-
dial arrest for traffic offenses are unreasonable seizures under
each of these criteria. Subsection A shows that arrests for mi-
nor traffic offenses are identical to the unlimited and arbitrary
power of the court's messengers and custom inspectors that led
to the adoption of the fourth amendment.202 Subsection B con-
siders whether custodial arrest for a minor offense was the ac-
cepted practice at the time the Constitution was adopted and
demonstrates that it was not. 203 Subsection C balances the gov-
ernment's interest in custodial arrest for traffic offenses against
the individual's privacy interest and concludes that in all cases
other than intoxication where the driver can identify himself,
the individual's interest in being free from seizure outweighs
the government's interest in enforcing the traffic laws through
custodial arrest. 204
A. The Fourth Amendment Was Designed to Prevent
Unlimited and Arbitrary Exercise of Government
Power to Search and Seize
In determining whether a particular government practice is
prohibited by the fourth amendment, the Court has frequently
begun by considering whether the challenged activity creates
the type of evil that the fourth amendment was designed to pre-
vent.205 The power to arrest for a minor traffic offense is pre-
cisely such an evil. The fourth amendment was designed to
prevent the arbitrary and indiscriminate searches permitted by
general warrants and writs of assistance.206 General warrants
and writs of assistance were harmful because they delegated to
the officer the power to decide whom to search and for what to
search.207 They granted the power to search without a showing
201. See, e.g., Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 701 (1981) (balancing prob-
able cause for intrusion against individual's privacy).
202. See infra notes 205-39 and accompanying text.
203. See infra notes 240-53 and accompanying text.
204. See infra notes 254-354 and accompanying text.
205. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583-90 (1980) (discussion of
immediate evils that motivated adoption of fourth amendment).
206. See infra notes 234-39 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ob-
jectionable features of general warrants and writs of assistance.
207. See infra notes 209-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of histori-
cal events that led to adoption of fourth amendment.
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of individualized suspicion that evidence of criminal activity
would be found in a particular place. The power to. search per-
mitted officers when they arrest for minor traffic offenses is es-
sentially that same delegation of discretion. The fact of arrest,
like the grant of authority under general warrants, permits the
officer to search without any showing of individualized suspi-
cion that evidence of criminal of criminal activity will be found.
1. The Political History Antecedent to the Fourth
Amendment
Unlike other provisions of the Constitution, the fourth
amendment has had a clear history; it grew from events that led
to the American Revolution.208 The amendment was a direct re-
sponse to the virtually unrestrained and judicially un-
supervised searches pursuant to the virtually unrestrained and
judicially unsupervised searches pursuant to general warrants
and writs of assistance.209 The early history of this search
power began with the Tudors. In the late 1400s and the early
1500s the crown sought to suppress undesirable publications.21o
Henry VIII continued this practice by requiring that all publica-
tions receive the crown's license before printing. To enforce this
censorship system, he created general warrants that provided
vast powers of search and seizure.211 Those engaged in ferret-
ing out evidence of seditious publications were permitted to
"'make search wherever it shall please them in any place . . .
within our kingdom of England ... and to seize, take hold, burn
... those books and things which are or shall be printed con-
trary to the form of any statute, act, or proclamation.' "212
Things got even worse in the first half of the 1600s with the
creation by James I of the first writs of assistance. The writs
were different from general warrants because they went beyond
papers and books and authorized searches for smuggled goods.
They were called writs of assistance because they ordered all
208. J. LANDYNSKY. SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 19 (1966).
209. [d. at 20.
210. [d. at 21.
211. [d.
212. [d. (quoting 1 E. ARBER, A 'I'RANSCRIPT OF THE REGISTERS OF THE COM-
PANY OF STATIONERS OF LONDON, 1554-1640, at xxxi (London 1875».
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the officers of the crown to assist in their execution.213 But it
was not until the reign of Charles I that the writs became com-
mon.214 He used them to collect a tonnage and poundage tax
that provoked widespread resistance.215
Simultaneously, the crown continued its quest to suppress
unwelcome printing. Three tribunals assisted in this endeavor:
the King's or Queen's (Privy) Council, the Court of Star Cham-
ber, and the ecclesiastical Court of High Commission.216 These
tribunals developed the search for forbidden materials into a
fine art, ferreting out both evidence of crimes known and un-
known.217 They were empowered to make extensive searches
and to seize indiscriminately.218
Abuses of the search power even survived the collapse of
the all-powerful monarchy. After Cromwell, the new Parlia-
ment passed the same kinds of laws.219 The press continued to
be controlled by sanctions after publication.220 The judiciary fi-
nally laid the groundwork for putting a halt to the general war-
rant. John Wilkes, who had printed a pamphlet violently
attacking the government,221 and John Entick, author of a criti-
cal newspaper,222 had both been the object of general warrant
searches. Each sued the government for trespass and won sub-
213. N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 28-29 (1970).
214. J. LANoYNSKl, supra note 208, at 22-23.
215. N. LAsSON, supra note 213, at 29-31.
216. [d. at 25-26.
217. One example of a Privy Council warrant authorized the search and
seizure of "all bookes, papers, writinges, and other things whatsoever that you
shall find in his house to be kept unlawfully and offensively, that the same maie
serve to discover the offense wherewith he is charged." [d. at 26-27 (quoting 26
ACTS OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL 425 (J. Dasent ed. 1895».
218. For instance, while Sir Edward Coke, the celebrated authority on the
common law and one of the most influential of the Crown's opponents, was on his
deathbed, his house was searched pursuant to a general warrant. The searchers
seized not only all his writings, including the manuscripts of his great legal works
and his will, but also his jewelry, money, and other valuables. [d. at 31. The
seizure of these last items was as related to seditious libel as the contents of the
crumpled cigarette box were to Gustafson's driving without a license.
219. [d. at 37.
220. J. LANDYNSKl, supra note 208, at 27. Between 1694 and 1792, people
were prosecuted for seditious libel, which punished after publication rather than
prohibited initial publication. [d.
221. Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P. 1763).
222. Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (KB. 1765).
47
144 PACE LAW REVIEW [Tribute
stantial verdicts. 223 Upholding the verdicts, Lord Camden dis-
missed Star Chamber precedent as void,224 thereby setting the
stage for the end of the general warrant.225 These events, how-
ever, did not affect the authority of the writs of assistance.226
Writs of assistance were used extensively in the colonies in
the 1760s and were a principal irritant to the colonists.227 The
writs were even more offensive than the general warrants,
which had at least been directed at the perpetrators of a partic-
ular offense; writs of assistance permitted unlimited discretion
and were valid for the life of the sovereign.228 The writs were
used to enforce duties passed by Parliament and were designed
to prevent the American colonies from trading outside the Em-
pire. Smuggling to avoid the taxes had become extremely
common. 229
The first court challenge to the writs on this continent (pos-
sibly the first step toward the revolution) came in 1760, when
George II died. The death of the Sovereign required that new
writs be issued. Sixty-three Boston merchants decided to chal-
lenge the issuance of new writs and hired James Otis, Jr., to
argue the case for them. Notwithstanding Otis's now-famous
oratory, he lost.230 Parliament then passed the Stamp Act, a
new and more onerous tax that caused a riot in Boston.231 The
relationship of the revolution to the writs is clear. John Adams,
who had been a young courtroom spectator during the argu-
ment in the writs-of-assistance case, later wrote:
'Mr. Otis' oration against the Writs of Assistance breathed into
this nation the breath oflife. [He] was a flame of fire! Every man
of a crowded audience appeared to me to go away, as I did, ready
to take arms against writs of assistance. Then and there was the
223. See Entick, 95 Eng. Rep. 818; Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 499.
224. Entick, 95 Eng. Rep. at 818; Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 499.
225. Immediately after judgment in Entick's case, and as a result of it and
Wilkes' case, the House of Commons declared general warrants to be universally
illegal. N. LASSON, supra note 213, at 49.
226. J. LANnYNSKI, supra note 208, at 30.
227. Id. at 31.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 30. In fact, John Hancock was once charged with smuggling and
was defended by John Adams in a case that was eventually dropped. Id. at 30
n.49.
230. Id. at 33-35.
231. Id. at 36.
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first scene of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain.
Then and there the child Independence was born. In 15 years,
namely in 1776, he grew to manhood, and declared himself
free.'232
The fourth amendment was in direct response to these abuses,
which had begun in England and which continued in the
colonies.233
2. The Relationship of Searches Following Traffic Arrests
to the Practices that Caused Enactment of the
Fourth Amendment
The objectionable feature of general warrants was their in-
discriminate character.234 In his remarkable Oliver Wendell
Holmes Lectures in 1974, Professor Anthony Amsterdam high-
lighted the evils of indiscriminate searches:
The first is that they expose people and their possessions to inter-
ferences by government when there is no good reason to do so.
The concern here is against unjustified searches and seizures: it
rests upon the principle that every citizen is entitled to security of
his person and property unless and until an adequate justification
for disturbing that security is shown. The second is that indis-
criminate searches and seizures are conducted at the discretion of
executive officials, who may act despotically and capriciously in
the exercise of the power to search and seize. This latter concern
runs against arbitrary searches and seizures: it condemns the
petty tyranny of unregulated rummagers.235
As with general warrants and writs of assistance, both un-
justified and arbitrary intrusions are presented when a police
officer has the power to arrest for a minor traffic offense. First,
such an arrest is unjustified. The indignity, powerlessness, and
inconvenience occasioned by a custodial arrest for the violation
of a malum prohibitum offense is excessive when the more civi-
lized traffic citation will accomplish the same result. As will be
232. N. LAsSON, supra note 213, at 59 (quoting 10 C. ADAMS, LIFE AND WORKS
OF JOHN ADAMS 247-48, 276 (1856».
233. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,583-84 (1980).
234. Amsterdam, supra note 70, at 411. The "basic purpose of [the Fourth]
Amendment . . . is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against
arbitrary invasions by governmental officials." Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
235. Amsterdam, supra note 70, at 411.
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discussed more fully below,236 the mere violation of a traffic or-
dinance has not been shown to furnish "adequate justification
for disturbing [a citizen's] security."237 There is simply no gov-
ernmental interest that justifies the extraordinary action ofcus-
todial arrest. As with ordinances prohibiting spitting on the
sidewalk or improperly bagging one's garbage, or the myriad of
other regulations that permit large groups of people to live to-
gether in relative harmony, enforcement of traffic regulations is
expected, custodial arrest is not. A traffic offense does not sub-
ject the offender to the kind of penalty that might invite him to
abscond, nor does it present the danger to society of a typical
criminal case. Arrests for traffic offenses, like searches permit-
ted by general warrants, are grants of authority without· a
showing that actions by the individual justify the intrusion.
Second, the authority to arrest for a traffic offense is the
arbitrary power that the authors of the fourth amendment most
feared. "The essential purpose of the proscriptions in the
Fourth Amendment is to impose a standard of 'reasonableness'
upon the exercise of discretion by government officials . . . 'to
safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbi-
trary invasions.' "238 In almost every state, police officers may
choose to arrest or issue a citation for the vast majority of of-
fenses. They may make this choice for good reason, bad reason,
or no reason. This indiscriminate power to arrest brings with it
the far-reaching power to search.239 Like the searches pursuant
to general warrants and writs of assistance, a search incident to
an arrest for a traffic offense is not limited by probable cause to
believe evidence of criminal conduct is present. Like the
crown's messengers who could search anyone suspected of bad
thoughts hoping to discover evidence or crimes they had no rea-
son to believe the person being searched committed, police of-
236. See infra notes 310-54 and accompanying te~ for discussion of a state's
interest in custodial arrest for traffic violations.
237. Amsterdam, supra note 70, at 411.
238. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979) (quoting Camara v. Mu-
nicipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967». See also Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436
U.S. 307 (1978); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976);
United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1975); Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U.S. 266, 270 (1973).
239. See supra notes 45-105 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Supreme Court opinions addressing searches incident to traffic violations.
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flcers may, by virtue of the power to arrest for a traffic offense,
conduct an exhaustive search of both defendants and their cars,
thereby discovering evidence that the officers had no reason to
think existed and that relates to crimes which they had no rea-
son to suspect. Such a search is the rummaging of the customs
inspector and the prying of the courts' messengers.
B. Common Law Authority for Arrest for Minor Offenses
One of the factors the Court considers when it evaluates
the reasonableness of an intrusion is the historical roots of the
practice.240 Custodial arrest for minor offenses has developed in
relatively recent times.241 Early common law prohibited arrest
for minor offenses.242
Prior to the mid 1800s,243 although it was possible for a
magistrate to order arrest in a summary case in this country,244
the summons was the rule.245 Even for misdemeanors,246 for
which a warrant could issue, it was common for a summons to
240. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411,415-24(976) (review of
history of common law rule that officer may arrest without warrant based upon
probable c~use); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,591-98 (1980) (examination of
common law on authority of officer to make warrantless arrest in home).
241. F. FEENEY, THE POLICE AND PRETRIAL RELEASE 12 (982).
242. W. PALEY, THE LAw AND PRACTICE OF SUMMARY CONVICTIONS 19 (London
1814).
243. The extent of review of the common law's attitude toward traffic offenses
is obviously limited since automobiles were not subject to regulation until they
were invented.
244. Summary cases were those that could be tried by a magistrate without a
jury and included "violations oflaw relating to liquor, trade and manufacture, la-
bor, smuggling, traffic on the highway, the Sabbath, cheats, gambling, swearing,
and dozens of others." F. FEENEY, supra note 241, at 12. .
245. J. GoEBEL & T. NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK
417 (1944).
246. Misdemeanors encompassed a wide range of offenses. They included as-
sault, even with the intent to rob, murder, or rape, abortion, bribing voters, com-
pounding felonies, cheating by false weights or measures, eavesdropping, forgery,
false imprisonment, forcible and violent entry, kidnapping, libel, mayhem, perjury,
and many other offenses. Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant (pt. 1), 22 MICH. L.
REV. 541, 572-73 (1924).
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be used.247 Not until the advent of a professional police force did
arrest rules begin to change.248 Legislatures then adopted stat-
utes granting sweeping arrest powers.249 Without considering
whether the taking of immediate custody was necessary, legis-
latures began to authorize custodial arrests for minor crimes.250
This change appears to have been aimed at making it easier to
arrest without a warrant, but the effect was to authorize custo-
dial arrests for many offenses, "such as ordinance and regula-
tory violations, that had previously not been subject to arrest at
all."251 By the time states began to regulate traffic offenses,
most jurisdictions permitted custodial arrests for virtually all
offenses.252 When traffic laws were created, the states merely
adopted the enforcement practices already in use for other vio-
lations.253 Custodial arrest for a traffic offense developed in rel-
atively recent times; it is not justified or foreshadowed by
common law practice.
C. A Balance of Individual Privacy Interests and
Governmental Interests Does Not Reasonably Justify
Custodial Arrest for Traffic Offenses
Generally, the fourth amendment is satisfied whenever a
search or seizure is based on probable cause254 and is conducted
247. F. FEENEY, supra note 241, at 12.
248. [d. at 13.
249. [d. See, e.g., the provision of the proposed Field Code of Criminal Proce-
dure, which authorized a peace officer to arrest without warrant for any "public
offense, committed or attempted in his presence." [d. at 13 n.22.
250. [d. at 13. As a general matter, very little attention is given to whether
there is a need for custody when persons are arrested for any offense. In practice
people are held until their first court appearance without any prior consideration
of whether the initial taking into custody was necessary. W. LAFAVE, supra note
115, at 168.
251. F. FEENEY, supra note 241, at 11.
252. [d. at 13.
253. [d. For instance, Pennsylvania's motor vehicle act, enacted in 1903, pro-
vided that "[ilt shall be the duty of the constables and police officers of ... this
Commonwealth to arrest upon view and without a warrant, any person or persons
violating [this actl." 1903 Pa. Laws 268, 270, § 10, reprinted in F. FEENEY, supra
note 241, at 15.
254. The court's most quoted definition of probable cause is "facts and circum-
stances ... such as to warrant a man of prudence and caution in believing that the
offense has been committed." Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642,645 (1878). Probable
cause must be measured by the facts of the particular case. Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963).
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pursuant to a properly issued warrant255 or in circumstances
that excuse the acquisition of one.256 If there were no more to it,
the arrest of a traffic offender would be constitutional on a
showing of probable cause to believe that the driver had vio-
lated a traffic ordinance. But the Supreme Court has held that
the mere existence of probable cause does not make a seizure
reasonable; search or seizure can be unreasonable, notwith-
standing the existence of probable cause, if the manner in which
the evidence or person is seized is unreasonable.257 Therefore,
the custodial arrest of a traffic offender could be unconstitu-
tional because the manner of the intrusion is unreasonable
under the circumstances.
In Schmerber v. California,258 the defendant was arrested
at a hospital where he was being treated for injuries sustained
in an automobile accident. A police officer ordered a physician
to take a sample ofSchmerber's blood for chemical analysis. On
the basis of that analysis, Schmerber was convicted of driving
under the influence of alcoho1.259 Schmerber challenged the in-
troduction of the chemical analysis as a product of an unconsti-
tutional search and seizure.260
The Court, in rejecting his claim, stated,
[T]he Fourth Amendment's proper function is to constrain, not
against all intrusions as such, but against intrusions which are
255. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453 (1971).
256. See supra note 31 and accompanying text for a discussion of circum-
stances excusing the obtainment of warrant.
257. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1984) (seizure unreasonable where
officers used deadly force to effectuate arrest of suspect for non-violent crime);
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 758 (1985) (Court considered degree of intrusion
when evaluating reasonableness of proposed surgical proceeding); Welsh v. Wis-
consin, 466 U.S. 740, 748 (1983) (warrantless, nighttime entry of petitioner's home
to arrest him for civil, non-jailable traffic offense was unreasonable notwithstand-
ing presence of probable cause); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)
(Court considered manner of search as well as presence or absence of probable
cause). For an interesting discussion of fourth amendment reasonableness in
terms of the amount of force used, the time at which an intrusion occurs, and the
duration of the intrusion, see Dix, Means of Executing Searches and Seizures as
Fourth Amendment Issues, 67 MINN. L. REV. 89 (1982).
258. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
259. Id. at 758-59.
260. Id. at 766. He also challenged the admissibility of the chemical analysis,
alleging a violation of his due process rights, his fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination, and his right to counsel. Each of these claims was found merit-
less. Id. at 759-66.
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not justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an .im-
proper manner. In other words, the questions we must decide in
this case are whether the means and procedures employed in tak-
ing [Schmerber's] blood respected relevant Fourth Amendment
standards of reasonableness.261
The Court considered more than the mere presence of probable
cause since it began its analysis with the assertion that, "[h]ere,
there was plainly probable cause,"262 The Court also held that a
search without a warrant was permissible since the percentage
of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking
stops and the time necessary to seek out a magistrate and se-
cure a warrant ~ould result in the loss of evidence.263 But
notwithstanding the Court's recognition that there was prob-
able cause to believe the search would reveal evidence and that
a warrantless search was permissible, it went on to consider the
manner in which the blood was extracted. Although the Cowt;
upheld the search, it did so only after determining that the
method of search was reasonable.264 Extractions of blood sam-
ples "are commonplace . . . and experience with them teaches
that the quantity of blood extracted is minimal, and that for
most people the procedure involves virtually no risk, trauma, or
pain."265 Additionally, the Court noted that the blood was ex-
tracted by a physician in a hospital according to accepted medi-
cal practices.266 Schmerber clearly indicates that a fourth
amendment intrusion can be unconstitutional because the man-
ner of the intrusion is unreasonable.
The mere existence of probable cause was also insufficient
to justify a search in Winston v. Lee.267 The defendant was ac-
261. [d. at 768.
262. [d.
263. [d. at 771. One ofthe recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement
is an emergency in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant would result in
the loss or destruction of evidence. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970).
264. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771.
265. [d. Among the circumstances that made this search reasonable was that
the defendant was not "one of the few who on grounds offear, concern for health, or
religious scruple might prefer some other means of testing, such as the
'breathalyser' test petitioner refused." [d. The Court expressly left open the ques-
tion of whether a defendant could insist on the less intrusive procedure if he met
any of those criteria. [d.
266. [d.
267. 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
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cused of attempted armed robbery and was believed to have a
bullet lodged in his chest.268 In determining whether surgical
removal should be permitted, the Court weighed Winston's in-
terests in privacy and security against society's interest in con-
ducting the procedure.269 The Court's inquiry focused on "the
extent of the intrusion on respondent's privacy interests and on
the State's need for the evidence,"27o and concluded that the
medical risks of the operation, "although apparently not ex-
tremely severe," militated against finding the operation reason-
able when balanced against the Commonwealth's failure "to
demonstrate a compelling need for it."271 In determining the
State's need for the evidence, the Court considered the strength
of the case against the petitioner.272 In this instance, the gov-
ernment's failure to show that it needed this intrusive search
resulted in the Court's finding the search unreasonable. Simi-
larly, in considering the reasonableness of custodial arrests for
minor traffic offenses, it is appropriate to consider the govern-
ment's need for the intrusion.
In Tennessee v. Garner,273 the Court considered the reason-
ableness of using deadly force to seize a suspect who was not
armed and who had not committed a violent crime. In doing so
it rejected the government's claim that the fourth amendment
had nothing to say about how a seizure was made:274
[Such a claim] ignores the many cases in which this Court, by bal-
ancing the extent of the intrusion against the need for it, has ex-
amined the reasonableness of the manner in which a search or
s'eizure is conducted. To determine the constitutionality of a
seizure '[w]e must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion
on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the im-
268. Id. at 755.
269. Id. at 760.
270. Id. at 763 (emphasis added).
271. Id. at 766. It should be emphasized here that the individual's interest is
in preserving his privacy (in this case the privacy of bodily integrity), not in sup-
pressing evidence that might tend to convict him. Because the individual's privacy
interest is so strong here, the governinent's need, i.e., that it cannot convict with-
out the evidence and conviction is important in this case, must be comparably
strong to permit the intrusion.
272. Id. at 765.
273. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
274. Id. at 7.
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portance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the
intrusion.'275
The Court pointed out that it has "described 'the balancing of
competing interests' as 'the key principle of the Fourth Amend-
ment' "276 and that "[b]ecause one of the factors is the extent of
the intrusion, it is plain that reasonableness depends on not
only when a seizure is made, but also how it is carried out."277
The Court concluded that, notwithstanding probable cause to
arrest the suspect in this case, the use of deadly force was too
intrusive for the offense violated.278
The Court's holding in Garner is particularly relevant to
the consideration of the constitutionality of custodial arrests for
traffic offenses. In Garner, the degree of intrusiveness in rela-
tion to the nature of the offense made the seizure unconstitu-
tional. These are precisely the considerations that argue
against the constitutionality of custodial arrests for traffic of-
fenses. Custodial arrest, instead of citation or summons, is sim-
ply too intrusive for enforcement of an offense as minor as a
traffic violation.
Finally, in Welsh v. Wisconsin,279 the Court held that the
fourth amendment prohibited a nighttime entry of petitioner's
home to arrest him for a minor traffic offense. The Court found
this intrusion unreasonable solely on the basis of the minor na-
275. [d. at 7-8 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983».
276. [d. at 8 (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 n.12 (1981)).
The Court identified a number of other instances in which it had balanced the
nature of the intrusion against the governmental interests to determine the consti-
tutionality of a seizure. [d. (citing Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 813 (1985) (de-
tention for fingerprinting without probable cause was unreasonable); Winston v.
Lee, 470 U.S 753, 767 (1985) (surgery under general anesthesia to obtain evidence
was unreasonable); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 700 (1983) (governmental
interests did not support lengthy detention ofluggage); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S.
491, 500 (1983) (airport seizure was not carefully tailored to its underlying justifi-
cations); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726 (1969) (detention for fingerprint-
ing without probable cause was unreasonable».
277. [d.
278. [d. at 11. The Court did not hold the statute that authorized the use of
deadly force to arrest for felonies unconstitutional on its face. Rather it concluded
that it was unconstitutional as applied. "If the suspect threatens the officer with a
weapon or there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime involv-
ing the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force
may be used if necessary to prevent escape ...." [d.
279. 466 U.S. 740 (1984).
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ture of the offense.28o A witness saw Edward Welsh driving er-
ratically and swerving off the road into an open field. The
witness spoke to Welsh and suggested that he wait for assist-
ance but Welsh, abandoning his vehicle, walked a few blocks to
his home. The witness waited by the vehicle, and when the po-
lice arrived a short time later, told them what he had seen and
mentioned that the driver of the vehicle was either very inebri-
ated or very sick. After checking the car's registration and
learning that the owner lived close by, the officers entered
Welsh's house and arrested him for driving while intoxicated.281
Welsh argued that the warrantless arrest in his home was
illegal.282 Although the Court had previously held that arrests
inside private dwellings required a warrant,283 it had also
stated that evidence in the process of destruction was an exi-
gent circumstance that excused a warrantless entrance into or
search of a home.284 In addition, Schmerber had held that the
destruction of evidence by the metabolic processes of the blood
was an emergency that excused a warrantless search for the al-
coholic content of one's blood.285 Yet the Welsh Court found this
particular arrest unreasonable. Notwithstanding the fact that
the evidence in Welsh's blood was being destroyed, the Court
considered the minor nature of the offense in determining the
reasonableness of the police conduct and concluded that Wis-
consin's decision to classify this offense as a minor one
is the best indication of the State's interest in precipitating an
arrest, and is one that can be easily identified both by the courts
and by officers faced with a decision to arrest.... Given this ex-
pression of the State's interest, a warrantless home arrest cannot
be upheld simply because evidence of the petitioner's blood-alco-
hol level might have dissipated while the police obtained a war-
rant. To allow a warrantless home entry on these facts would be
280. [d. at 754.
281. [d. at 742-43.
282. [d. at 747.
283. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
284. See, e.g., Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35 (1970) (warrantless search
justified if evidence is in the process of destruction); Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10, 15 (1948) (warrantless search may be justified after hot pursuit of fleeing
felon).
285. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771.
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to approve unreasonable police behavior that the principles of the
Fourth Amendment will not sanction.286
Although the intrusion in Welsh can be distinguished from the
arrest for a normal traffic offense because of the additional en-
try of Welsh's home, the government's interest was also greater,
for without the blood-alcohol test the chances of convicting
Welsh were small.287
Thus, a seizure can be unreasonable because it is too intru-
sive or unjustified by the circumstances, notwithstanding the
existence of probable cause. In determining whether a particu-
lar practice is reasonable, the court balances the nature of the
individual's fourth amendment interests against the govern-
ment's interest in the intrusion. The same balancing test may
be applied to custodial arrests for traffic offenses. To evaluate
the reasonableness of such action, the Court would first balance
the nature and quality of the individual's interest in being free
from custodial arrests against the government's interest in the
custodial arrest of a traffic offender. Only if the government's
interest is sufficient to justify the intrusion can custodial arrest
for a traffic offense survive constitutional challenge.
1. The Nature of the Intrusion
A custodial arrest is a serious intrusion on a person's free-
dom and privacy.288 In a society in which freedom and indepen-
dence are valued, arrest is the gravest of indignities. One
arrested is not only no longer free to walk awaY,289 but also is
suddenly in the control of another human being. If he resists,
force will be used. A person arrested can no longer choose when
286. Welsh, 466 U.S. 754.
287. Not only would there be no scientific evidence ofWelsh's intoxication, but
there were no police witnesses. The sole witness thought the defendant was either
very drunk or very sick. See id. at 742. Traffic arrests, on the other hand, are
offenses observed by a police officer whose testimony is generally sufficient for con-
viction, and normally the government's interest in conviction is not furthered by
custodial arrest.
288. See Barrett, Personal Rights, Properly Rights, and the Fourth Amend-
ment, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 46 (loss offreedom and/or privacy results from even tem-
porary detentions).
289. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,553-54 (1980) (person is
"seized" when freedom of movement is restrained by means of physical force or
show of authority).
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he eats, with whom he associates, where or whether he will sit
or stand, or even when he may go the bathroom.
The physical restraint on freedom is not all that an ar-
rested person suffers. Personal privacy is also violated. A per-
son arrested is booked;290 a record is made of the arrest, usually
including fingerprints and sometimes photographs.291 The rec-
ord may be permanent, whether or not the individual is ulti-
mately convicted of the offense for which he or she is charged.292
The arrestee will certainly be searched.293 Although the search
may be limited to a frisk, it is nonetheless more than a "petty
indignity"294 as "the officer must feel with sensitive fingers
every portion of the prisoner's body. A thorough search must be
made of the prisoner's arms and armpits, waistline and back,
the groin ... ,and entire surface of the legs down to the feet."295
Probably a more extensive search will be conducted.296 In addi-
tion to a search of the person's body, the police may look in
pockets, in any containers that may be in those pockets, and in
a purse or briefcase.297 The search of a traffic offender will ex-
tend to the person's car and anything inside the car.298 The in-
trusion on privacy is complete.
290. See, e.g., LA. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 228 (West 1967), which
provides:
It is the duty of every peace officer making arrest, or having an arrested
person in his custody, promptly to conduct the person arrested to the near-
est jailor police station and cause him to be booked. A person is booked by
an entry, in a book kept for that purpose, showing his name and address,
the offense charged against him, by whom he was arrested, a list of any
property taken from him, and the date and time of booking. Every jail and
police station shall keep a book for the listing of the above information as to
each prisoner received. The book shall always be open for public inspection.
The person booked shall be imprisoned unless he is released on bail.
291. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 160.10, at 410 (McKinney 1981) (au-
thorizing fingerprinting and photographing of arrestees).
292. See generally Doernberg & Zeigler, Due Process Versus Data Processing:
An Analysis of Computerized Criminal History Information Systems, 55 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1110,1114 (even when case results in acquittal or dismissal, arrest record is
frequently maintained and disseminated).
293. L.TIFFANY, supra note 114, at 121 (almost all arrestees searched if taken
into custody and incarcerated at police station).
294. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1967).
295. Id. at 17 n.13 (quoting Priar & Martin, Searching and Disarming
Criminals, 45 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY, & POLICE SCI. 481 (1954».
296. L. TIFFANY, supra note 114, at 142.
297. Priar & Martin, supra note 295, at 481-82.
298. Id. at 482.
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The Court has recognized that there are different kinds of
police interferences with individual freedom, a full custodial
arrest being the most serious.299 Arrest is the quintessential
seizure.300 For a custodial arrest and a trip to the stationhouse,
the Court reserves its most demanding standard; only probable
cause to believe the suspect has committed a crime can justify a
custodial arrest.301 In this way, the Court pays homage to the
serious nature of the intrusion.
Miranda v. Arizona302 exemplifies the Court's recognition
that custody is a substantial dehumanizing force. The Court re-
quires that a suspect be warned of the right to remain silent
before he or she can be subjected to interrogation due to the
inherently coercive environment of the stationhouse.303 This is
in sharp contrast to the Court's refusal to require Miranda
warnings during a traffic stop. In Berkemer v. McCarty,304 the
Court acknowledged that a traffic stop significantly curtailed
the freedom of a driver and his passengers and that in most
states it would be a crime to ignore an officer's direction to
299. As noted earlier, more serious even than custodial arrest is the use of
deadly force to effectuate that arrest. Such an intrusion requires probable cause
plus a reason to think the person is armed or has committed a crime using violence
or the threat of violence. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1984). See
supra notes 273-78 and accompanying text for a discussion ofGarner. At the lower
end of the intrusion scale is a non-detention encounter between a police officer and
a citizen. A police officer may approach a person in a public place in order to ask
questions. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554-55 (1980). The average
person may not feel free to walk away, but this intrusion is so slight, so similar to
that involved in normal social discourse, that the Court requires no justification for
it at all. LaFave, "Seizures" Typology: Classifying Detentions of the Person to Re-
solve Warrant, Grounds, and Search Issues, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 417, 424-25
(1984). Police may approach a person and talk to him or her for good reasons, bad
reasons, or no reasons. The police may also insist that the individual stop. Adams
v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) (reasonable suspicion is sufficient to permit force-
able detention). Although a forceable stop is certainly a seizure, it may be permit-
ted on less than probable cause if it is for a brief period of time and is based on
reasonable suspicion. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). But such an intrusion
is more limited than a custodial arrest.
300. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428 (1976) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
301. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979) (standard of probable
cause represents accumulated wisdom of precedent and experience as to the mini-
mum justification necessary to make arrest reasonable).
302. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
303. Id. at 457-58.
304. 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
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stop.305 While recognizing that a traffic stop is a seizure under
the fourth amendment, the Court found that "circumstances as-
sociated with the typical traffic stop are not such that the mo-
torist feels completely at the mercy of the police" and refused to
require the warnings.306 The Court noted two ways in which a
traffic stop was less oppressive than a custodial arrest. First, it
is presumptively temporary and brief:
A motorist's expectations, when he sees a policeman's light flash-
ing behind him, are that he will be obliged to spend a short period
of time answering questions and waiting while the officer checks
his license and registration, that he may then be given a citation;
but that in the end he most likely will be allowed to continue on
his way.307
Second, a motorist feels less vulnerable to police authority, par-
tially because the encounter is in public and partially because
the individual is usually confronted by only one or two officers,
not the "police-dominated environment" of the stationhouse.308
Although not the issue in Berkemer, the Court clearly assumed
that custodial arrest was reserved for only the most serious
traffic offenses.30g
It is beyond dispute that a custodial arrest is a grave intru-
sion on an individual's fourth amendment interests. It is also
certain that a traffic stop, while a seizure, is not of the same
magnitude as a custodial arrest. Having established the seri-
ousness of the intrusion on the individual's fourth amendment
interest in being free from seizure, the governmental interests
in custodial arrest must be examined to consider whether they
justify this most serious intrusion on freedom.
305. Id. at 436.
306. Id. at 438.
307. Id. at 437.
308. Id. at 438-39.
309. Id. at 437 & n.26. The Court noted that no state requires that a detained
motorist be arrested unless accused of specified serious crimes. Id. at 437 n.26. Cf.
id. ("advocating mandatory release on citation of all drivers except those charged
with specified offenses, those who fail to furnish satisfactory self-identification,
and those as to whom officer has 'reasonable and probable grounds to believe ...
will disregard a written promise to appear in court' ") (quoting NATIONAL COMMIT-
TEE ON UNIFORM TRAFFIC LAWS AND ORDINANCES, UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE AND
MODEL TRAFFIC ORDINANCE §§ 16-203 to 16-206 (Supp. 1979)).
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2. The Nature of the Governmental Interests
To examine the government's interest in custodial arrests
for traffic offenses, one must first identify the government's in-
terest in custodial arrest for any offense. Governmental inter-
ests in custodial arrests include: 1) insuring the presence' of the
suspect to answer the charges against him or her;310 2) ob-
taining evidence of the crime of which the suspect is accused;311
3) preventing future harm;312 4) providing certain social service
functions;313 and 5) maintaining the proper respect for law and
the police.314 A fortiori the government has no great~r interest
in arresting a traffic offender than it does in arresting a person
suspected of committing a criminal offense. Although the inter-
ests may not be identical, the interests associated with arrests
generally will be considered and traffic offenses examined
within those terms.
a. To insure the presence of the suspect at trial
The government's interest in insuring the defendant's pres-
ence at the trial is strong and legitimate. The goals of regula-
tion will be defeated if offenders are not subject to sanction.
The relationship between the power to arrest and this govern-
mental interest is recognized in many states' legislation. The
vast majority of states that limit the power of a police officer to
arrest for a traffic offense specifically preserve that authority if
the officer has reason to think the arrestee will not appear.315
310. W. LAFAVE, supra note 115, at 177-82; Folk, The Case for Constitutional
Constraints Upon the Power to Make Full Custody Arrests, 48 U. CIN. L. REV. 321,
330-31 (1979).
311. W. LAFAVE, supra note 115, at 186-89; Folk, supra note 310, at 331.
312. W. LAFAVE, supra note 115, at 193-95; Folk, supra note 310, at 332.
313. W. LAFAVE, supra note 115, at 198-99; Folk, supra note 310, at 332.
314. W. LAFAVE, supra note 115, at 199-202; Folk, supra note 310, at 332-33.
315. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.015(2) (Baldwin 1985) (police officer
may not make physical arrest for minor misdemeanor unless, if citation issued,
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant will not appear at des-
ignated time); LA. CODE CRIM. FRoc. ANN. art. 211 (West Supp. 1988) (officer may
give written summons instead of making arrest ifofficer reasonably believes that
person will appear); NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-427 (1985) (officer may arrest with rea-
sonable grounds to believe accused will not respond to the citation); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 1115.l(A)(2) (West Supp. 1989) (officer shall issue citation unless
there is a substantial likelihood that person will refuse to respond to a citation).
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Obviously, the power to arrest can only completely assure
appearance at trial if it is accompanied by the power to detain
until judgment. This is a virtual impossibility in a traffic
case.3lG Nonetheless, the state's interest in assuring appear-
ance can be enhanced by arrest, because custodial arrest per-
mits the state to firmly establish the suspect's identity through
fingerprinting, record checking, or further investigation. It also
provides an opportunity to investigate the defendant's ties to
community, such as residence, employment, and family, all fac-
tors that are viewed as bearing on the probability that the ac-
cused will appear.317 Finally, custodial arrest allows for the
imposition of a bond or other conditions on release which are
traditionally viewed as encouraging appearance.
Notwithstanding these legitimate concerns, it is not clear
that custodial arrest is either necessary or sufficient to assure a
defendant's presence at trial. As to the underlying assumption
that failure-to-appear rates are influenced by a defendant's
community ties, there is some evidence that this reliance has
been misplaced.3lB Recent studies of failure-to-appear rates in
nontraffic cases have not shown traditional factors such as age,
length of residence, marital status, and employment status to
be significant predictors of flight. 3l9
The fear that out-of-state drivers will disregard a traffic ci-
tation is significant in traffic cases. But this danger has been
eliminated to a large extent by the Nonresident Violator Com-
pact of 1977.320 Many states now enforce the traffic laws of
316. Serious substantive due process concerns would be implicated by such a
rule because the government's interest in incarcerating a person for such a minor
offense for the period necessary to adjudicate guilt or innocence is not sufficient to
justify the deprivation ofliberty involved. See, e.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S.
715, 731 (1972) (person who has not been convicted of a crime cannot be held more
than the reasonable period of time).
317. See W. LAFAVE, supra note 115, at 180-86.
318. See Whitcomb, Lewin & Levine, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CITATION RELEASE, 46 (1984) [hereinafter CITATION RELEASE]
(some current research sheds doubt on earlier findings regarding community ties
as predictor of flight).
319. See Eskridge, Predicting and Protecting Against Failure in Pretrial Re-
lease: The State of the Art, 4 PRE-TRlAL SERVS. ANN. J. 34, 35 (1981) (failure-to-
appeal rates in non-traffic cases do not seem to correlate to traditional predictors of
flight).
320. This is a uniform act, adopted by at least 37 states, designed to allow a
nonresident motorist to accept a traffic citation and proceed without the entangle-
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other states by suspending the licenses of their residents who
have failed to respond to a summons of a sister-state until the
driver resolves the traffic offense in the courts of the sister-
state.321
Identifying the offender, probably the most important fac-
tor in securing future attendance, is more easily accomplished
for a traffic violator than for other offenses. Every jurisdiction
requires licensing of drivers and registration of vehicles.322
Most drivers can prove their identity at the scene of the viola-
tion. Additionally, the increased use of computers, even by
small police departments, permits checking the information
supplied.323 Obviously, the need for this information is crucial
to the successful operation of any citation system. Conse-
quently, it may be reasonable to subject a driver to custodial
arrest because his or her identity is unknown.
Finally, the seriousness of the offense has always been con-
sidered a factor in the probability of appearance. "The offender
who, at most, will receive a small fine is generally much more
likely to appear than one who anticipates a severe prison sen-
tence."324 Traffic offenses, even the most serious, are almost al-
ways enforced by fines. Justification of the arrest of one
charged with a minor offense, particularly if the individual's
identity is known, requires a presumption that a person will not
appear. Until the recent adoption of the federal preventive de-
tention statutes,325 the only justification for pretrial detention
ment of posting bond or being taken directly to court. "As of February 1986, the
following jurisdictions had enacted the Compact: Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Ken-
tucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Da-
kota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, D.C., and West Virginia." Maumee
v. Gabriel, 35 Ohio St. 3d 60, 60-61 & n.3, 518 N.E.2d 558, 559-60 & n.3 (1988).
321. See, e.g., N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAw § 517 (McKinney 1986).
322. See, e.g., N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAw §§ 401, 501 (McKinney 1986).
323. See CITATION RELEASE, supra note 318, at 11.
324. W. LAFAVE, supra note 115, at 179.
325. Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. I, §§ 202-210, 98
Stat. 1837, 1976-87 (codified as amended principally at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3062, 3141-
3150 (Supp. IV 1986», held constitutional in United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct.
2095 (1987). This statute authorizes the detention of individuals to assure the
safety of the community. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). Until the passage of this version of
the statute, detention was only authorized to assure the appearance of the person
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was to insure the presence of the suspect at trial.326 For years,
there has been a presumption in favor of release after arrest for
people accused of federal crimes.327 The same presumption
ought certainly to exist for traffic offenders.328 The minor na-
ture of these offenses argues in favor of the use of a citation.
The government's interest in assuring appearance cannot alone
justify the serious fourth amendment intrusion of a custodial
arrest in cases involving charges so minor that some states do
not even make them crimes.329
b. To obtain evidence of the crime for which the
suspect is arrested
In most criminal cases, the police expect to continue their
investigation after the suspect is arrested.330 At a minimum,
they expect to search for any evidence the arrestee might have
on his or her person or within his or her reach.33l They may
want to put the arrestee in a line-up or conduct some other
identification procedure.332 They probably hope to get a state-
ment from the arrestee regarding his or her participation in the
crime.333 Except in the case of offenses involving drunk or
drugged drivers, there is simply no evidence of the traffic of-
as required. Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (a) (1982), amended by Bail
Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (Supp. IV 1986).
326. W. LAFAVE, supra note 115, at 177.
327. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1,4 (1951) (since 1789, federal law "unequivo-
cally" stated arrested person "shall" be admitted to bail for non-capital offense);
Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. § 3146(2) (1982) (any person charged with of-
fense other than one punishable by death "shall" be released on recognizance or
bail unless judicial officer determines such release will not reasonably assure ap-
pearance), amended by Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142, 3146 (Supp. IV
1986).
328. The expectation in traffic cases is that the offender will not physically
appear. Traffic enforcement systems are designed to permit the vast majority of
cases to reach judgment by admitting guilt and paying a fine through the mail.
See, e.g., N.Y. VEH. & 1'RAF. LAW § 1805 (McKinney 1986) (traffic offender may
mail guilty plea instead of appearing in court).
329. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 153.505(2) (Supp. 1987) (traffic offender does
not incur "disability" or "legal disadvantage" of criminal conviction),
330. W. LAFAVE, supra note 115, at 188.
331. [d. at 187.
332. [d. at 304, 312.
333. [d. at 304, 313-18.
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fense to be gained through detention.334 Although interrogation
may result in an admission that the driver did commit an of-
fense, it hardly seems appropriate to authorize custodial arrest
for this purpose.335 The government simply does not have a suf-
ficient interest in further investigation of traffic offenses to jus-
tify the custodial arrest for a traffic offender.
c. To prevent future harm
The risk that the suspect will commit future crimes or be a
danger to others is an important factor in the decision to arrest
or release.336 It is frequently the underlying justification for de-
taining people without bailor on high bail even though it is not
a statutorily authorized ground.337 Until the Supreme Court re-
cently upheld the federal preventive detention statute,338 the
constitutionality of preventive detention was at least doubtful
and certainly would not extend to traffic offenses. Whatever the
government's interests in pre-trial preventive detention for
criminal conduct,339 the issues are considerably different in the
case of traffic offenses.
334. United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1972), rev'd,
414 U.S. 218 (1973).
335. Permitting custodial arrest in order to permit further investigation in-
vites use of a traffic offense as a pretext to investigate other activity. In fact, Pro-
fessor LaFave pointed out in his study of arrest that police frequently use traffic
offenses to arrest when they cannot do so for the crime they are investigating. W.
LAFAVE, supra note 115, at 187.
336. W. LAFAVE, supra note 115, at 193.
337. Compare N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 510.30 (McKinney 1984) (providing
specific factors and criteria for determination of bail and not including danger to
community as appropriate consideration) with People v. Melville, 62 Misc. 2d 366,
376, 308 N.Y.S.2d 671, 680 (Crim. Ct. 1970) (remanding defendant without bail
because court viewed him as danger to community notwithstanding provisions of
statute).
338. See United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095, 2105 (1987) (pretrial de-
tention provisions not unconstitutional because they protect society from persons
arrested for serious felonies after hearing establishes threat to community). See
also supra note 325 and accompanying text.
339. See Alschuler, Preventive Pre-Trial Detention and the Failure ofInterest-
Balancing Approaches to Due Process, 85 MICH. L. REV. 510, 548-50 (1986) (govern-
mental interests are protection of community and prevention of flight); Foote, The
Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail (pts. 1-2), 113 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 1125, 1166
(1965) (basis for preventative detention is arrestees' failure to appear at trial and
danger that arrestees may commit further crimes).
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A number of states that limit the arrest power of police per-
mit an arrest if "there is a reasonable likelihood that the offense
would continue or resume, or that persons or property would be
endangered by the arrested person."340 Closer examination of
this exception reveals that it permits arrest for a very large
number of traffic offenses, offenses for which most of us would
be surprised to be arrested. For instance, all equipment viola-
tions would fall into this group. As a rule these are the least
serious of the motor vehicle offenses and should never be sub-
ject to arrest. yet, it is certainly true that a person driving a car
with a broken headlight who is permitted to leave after the issu-
ance of a citation will continue or resume the offense, at least
until the car is parked. Violation of these regulatory provisions
can occur without the driver even knowing about the defect, and
the danger presented is often negligible. Impounding the car
would be sufficient to meet any governmental need to prevent
future harm from a serious and dangerous equipment failure.
The state has an interest in regulating automobile equipment,
but such interest is not sufficient to permit the custodial arrest
of the driver of the car.
Likewise, individuals who commit license, registration, in-
spection, and insurance violations would be subject to arrest be-
cause such violations continue even after a citation is issued.
But people who leave their licenses at home, drive after they
have been suspended or revoked, or fail to pass the required
examinations in the first place need not be arrested. The ulti-
mate penalty for a license or registration violation will be more
serious than that for an equipment violation, but there is no
greater need to arrest.
The most troublesome group of offenses is moving viola-
tions. Speeding; reckless driving, going through a red light, and
changing lanes improperly all conceivably endanger others, but
the only reason to think these offenses will continue is that they
happened in the first place. A driver who is reckless once is,
arguably, likely to be reckless again. Although it is a much
closer question, such offenses should not be predicates for custo-
dial arrest. As with all traffic offenses, the offender will proba-
340. TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-118(c)(2) (Supp. 1988). Accord OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, § 1114.2a(c) (West 1986); LA. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 211(2) (West
Supp. 1988).
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bly get a fine. He or she will be released after posting bail at the
stationhouse or after appearing before a magistrate. When re-
leased, the offender is gong to get into his or her car and drive
away. It is difficult to see why the state's interest in safety is
better served by arresting and later releasing the offender than
by issuing a citation and then letting him or her drive away.
The reckless driver will be subject to the same sanctions
whether he or she has been arrested or cited. Since the state's
interest in safety is not enhanced by arresting this group of of-
fenders, the interest cannot justify custodial arrest.
There is a class of traffic offense for which arrest is appro-
priate. Intoxicated drivers do present a danger to others that
justifies arrest. The state's interest in removing a drunk driver
from the road outweighs the individual's interest in freedom. 341
Unlike arrests for other motor vehicle offenses, an arrest in this
instance accomplishes a legitimate and specific goal. The driver
can be removed from the road for the limited period necessary
for the effects of the intoxicant to wear off. There is universal
agreement on the appropriateness of arresting a drunk driver.
Every state permits such an arrest.342 The state does have a
legitimate interest in protecting the safety of its roads and
arrest should be permitted when to do so promotes that inter-
est. However, the state's interest in safety is furthered by ar-
resting only one class of offenders, the intoxicated driver.
d. To provide certain social service functions
Custodial arrest may provide certain welfare services.343
For instance, when an officer finds a juvenile drinking in a pub-
lic park late at night, the officer could issue a citation as proba-
bly would. be done if the offender were an adult. But for a
fourteen year old, an arrest may be appropriate so that the of-
341. Even the driver who is not legally intoxicated but in possession of drugs
or alcohol in plain view can be arrested. The arrest is for possession and is not a
vehicle or traffic offense.
342. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 32-1-4(b) (1983) (traffic offender not released from
custody if charged with "driving while under the influence"). Accord GA. CODE
ANN. § 40-13·53(b)(l) (1985); IND. CODE § 9-4-1-130.1(3) (1987); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 431.015(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985).
343. W. LAFAVE, supra note 115, at 198 (medical services such as removing
prostitutes from street and examining them); Folk, supra note 310, at 332 (protec-
tion of public health or suspect).
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ficer can return the child to his or her parents. Similarly a po-
lice officer might arrest an intoxicated person on a cold night
just to get the individual out of the cold. Whether it is ever ap-
propriate to use the criminal justice system for these welfare
services is debatable,344 but arrest of a traffic offender is not jus-
tified by the need to provide these services. It is simply inappli-
cable here.
e. To maintain the proper respect for the law and
the police
Arrest is one of the ways law enforcement officers maintain
control and exercise their authority. The state has an interest
in police officers' ability to function effectively. However, the
authority to exercise unlimited discretion to arrest in situations
where the police very infrequently arrest invites abuse of that
discretion.345 This is most common in the cases of traffic of-
fenses or other minor crimes.346 A frequent example is when a
police officer stops a person for speeding with the intention of
issuing a ticket but subsequently decides to arrest because the
driver was belligerent or disrespectful,347 The use of the police
power in this way is subject to criticism.
Arrest should not be viewed as punishment, even in a more
neutral context. For instance, the police might decide to arrest
if speeding in a certain locale is rampant in order to show that it
is a matter for official concern.348 But, punishment is the job of
344. Folk, supra note 310, at 332.
345. Cf., e.g., Thomas & Fitch, The Exercise ofDiscretionary Decision-Making
by the Police, 54 N.D.L. REV. 61, 79 (1977) (police base decision to arrest on sus-
pect's demeanor).
346. W. LAFAVE, supra note 115, at 147.
347. Cf. Thomas & Fitch, supra note 345, at 79-80 (suspect who is disrespect-
ful to police officer more likely to be arrested). An interesting study on the factors
that influence the decision to arrest revealed that officers were just as likely to
arrest the obsequious offender as the antagonistic one. The arrest rate for very
deferential suspects was as high as the arrest rate for the disrespectful. Id. at 80
(citing Black & Reiss, Police Control of Juveniles, 35 AM. Soc. REV. 63, 74-75
(1970». Thus, "[slhould the suspect, for whatever reason, overreact in either the
direction of too much or too little deference to police authority, the probability of
his arrest, quite independently of what he has done or the evidence that is avail-
able ... , is influenced." Id. at 81.
348. This kind of occasional beefing up of enforcement efforts is frequently
seen on the lower end of criminal offenses, simply to remind everyone that the
offense is still a crime. See W. LAFAVE, supra note 115, at 148.
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the judge. Ifenforcement in a particular area or for a particular
offense needs enhancing, the sentence imposed at conviction
can be increased. The role of the police is to initiate the process
that results in enforcement. Delegating the entire enforcement
process to the police is not necessary to maintain proper respect
for the law or the police. The state's interest in maintaining
respect for the police is improperly satisfied if custodial arrest
for traffic offenses is permitted for this purpose.
3. The Result of the Balance
Any hypothesized state interest in arrest is undercut by
consideration of the costs of arrest. In 1984, the National Insti-
tute of Justice released a report concluding that citation release
offered substantial cost savings over custodial arrest.349 Among
the advantages were reductions in patrol officer time350 and
transportation,351 and booking352 and detention costS.353 Cita-
tion release procedures were also found to contribute to reduced
349. CITATION RELEASE, supra note 318, at 4-5 (field release saves money).
350. Id. at 17-18. Citation release returns the officer to duty much faster than
custodial release. One study found that field release saved from 4 to 46 minutes
over traditional arrests. NATIONAL mST. OF CORRECTIONS, COUNTYWIDE CITATION
RELEASE PROGRAMMING 26-27 (prepared by J. Needle & W. Busher, American Jus-
tice Institute 1982). The Nassau County Police Department found that it saved
10,242 officer hours in 1976 when it instituted a field release procedure for shop-
lifting arrestees. CITATION RELEASE, supra note 318, at 18 (citing NASSAU COUNTY
POLICE DEP'T, CRIMINAL JUSTICE FOR THE NON-CRIMINAL 9-10 (prepared by D. Wolf
1977». This "street time" saved will be even more marked in those jurisdiction
which use two-officer cars. Id. at 17.
351. CITATION RELEASE, supra note 318, at 17-18. There are transportation
costs in addition to the time involved. This is particularly true for traffic offenses
since it is usually necessary to take the offenders to the stationhouse individually
in a patrol car rather than using a van or wagon to transport a number ofindividu-
also Fuel costs can mount, particularly in jurisdictions that are geographically dis-
persed. Id.
352. Id. at 18.
353. Id. The amount saved in detention costs can be substantial. The amount
depends on the cost of detention in the jurisdiction and on whether the particular
jurisdiction's procedure permits release by the officer at the station or provides
that the defendant be arraigned before a magistrate. Examples of detention costs
are: care and custody at the Boulder County jail at $45 a day; payment of a book-
ing fee of $58 per misdemeanor plus, after the first 12 hours, a subsistence fee of
$7.50 for each six hours by the Minneapolis Police Department; detention costs of
$42 a day in San Francisco. Id.
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jail populations and reduced complaints from defendants about
jail conditions or maltreatment by arresting officers.354
The balancing test is designed to evaluate the reasonable-
ness of a particular governmental activity in relation to the re-
strictions required by the fourth amendment. The nature of the
fourth amendment interest at issue in arrest is the most funda-
mental one-freedom. Custodial arrest is unreasonable unless
the governmental interests require this action. The govern-
ment's interest is in enforcing its traffic laws and providing for
safe use of the roads and highways; that interest does not re-
quire custodial arrest for the ordinary traffic offense. Common
experience testifies to the adequacy of a summons or citation.
Millions of Americans receive tickets each year and subse-
quently pay the required fines. The infrequency with whichthe
government chooses to arrest for a traffic offense suggests that
even the police do not think it is generally necessary to do so.
Imagine the uproar if police began to arrest every driver who
violates a traffic law. Although the government does have a le-
gitimate interest in assuring the presence of the defendant at
trial, this interest is only minimally forwarded by custodial
arrest, and then only in those instances where the offender can-
not provide evidence of identity. Other interests associated
with arrests for more serious crimes are less relevant for traffic
offenses. For instance, the government's interest in discovering
evidence is absent since there is generally no evidence of traffic
offenses that can be discovered by search. Similarly, the gov-
ernment's interest in preventing future crime is only forwarded
by custodial arrest in the case of intoxicated drivers. In this
instance, incapacitation long enough for the effects of the alco-
hol to wear off has its obvious benefits. For other traffic of-
fenses, custodial arrest only delays release of the offender until
he or she has bee arraigned or has posted bail, at which point
the offender mayor may not continue the unlawful conduct.
Therefore, custodial arrest can be justified only in those in-
stances where the suspect cannot provide identification or has
been driving while intoxicated. It is only in these instances that
the government can show any need for the significant intrusion
of a custodial arrest.
354. [d. at 19-20.
71
168 PACE LAW REVIEW
Conclusion
[Tribute
Robinson, Gustafson, and Belton have authorized far-reach-
ing search power for a common police-citizen encounter-the
traffic offense. With no more than probable cause to believe
that a driver has committed a traffic offense, a police officer
may, after arrest, search the driver, the personal items in his or
her possession, and the passenger compartment of the car he or
she was driving. The officer need have no reason to believe that
any weapon or evidence of a crime will be found. The authority
to conduct these wide-ranging searches is the byproduct of the
power to arrest. It has no independent justification. Yet the
decision to arrest is generally within the sole discretion of the
officer. In most jurisdictions the officer may arrest for the most
minor offense and need have no reason for doing so. The danger
inherent in this situation is that an officer may use this arrest
power to harass or to search a person without sufficient in-
dependent justification. Empirical evidence demonstrates that
such searches frequently occur. They are both unjustified and
indiscriminate, the twin evils that the fourth amendment was
designed to prevent. Efforts to control this conduct directly, by
suppressing evidence acquired on a showing of pretext, are un-
successful because proving an officer's motive to arrest is very
difficult. Efforts to reduce the scope of the permissible search
are not welcome due to the fear that properly motivated officers
will be endangered by close, extended contact with arrestees
without adequate opportunity to discover hidden weapons. This
argument fails to take into account the fact that the officer is in
close extended contact with the traffic violator only because the
officer has arrested the individual. If the offender is not ar-
rested, the potential for improper or pretextual searches
vanishes.
But legislatures have not restricted the discretion of the of-
ficer to arrest for a minor offense in most jurisdictions. Twenty-
eight states grant complete authority to the officer to decide
whether to arrest or issue the normally expected traffic
ticket.355 The fourth amendment was designed to prevent just
such discretion. The search that occurs as a result of a traffic
355. See supra note 188 for a list of the twenty-eight states that give police
officers complete discretion to decide whether to arrest or issue a citation.
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arrest is similar to the search permitted by the writs of assist-
ance and general warrants in that it is not justified by any rea-
son to believe that evidence of criminal activity is present. As
with the power of the writs of assistance, the power to conduct
the search (which is derivative from the power to arrest) is the
product of a grant of authority that permits indiscriminate and
arbitrary exercise. The searcher under a writ of assistance
could decide, from the entire population, whom he wanted to
search. The officer may make that same decision from almost
an identical pool-the population of licensed drivers. Such in-
discriminate power to seize and thereby search seems, on its
face, to be prohibited by the fourth amendment admonition
against unjustified and arbitrary searches and seizures. Yet
the power to arrest survives constitutional challenge only if it is
reasonable.
Whether custodial arrest for a traffic offense is reasonable
depends on whether the governmental interests served out-
weigh the individual's interests sacrificed. Government's inter-
est in custodial arrest for most traffic offenses is trifling.
Enforcement of the traffic laws simply does not require the
unique and humiliating experience of arrest. A search or
seizure can be unreasonable, even ifjustified by probable cause,
if it is unreasonably accomplished. The government's interest
in enforcing its traffic regulations is satisfied by issuing a cita-
tion whenever the driver can provide adequate identification,
except in the case of an intoxicated driver. In every other cir-
cumstances, custodial arrest is unnecessary and excessive, and
presents the opportunity for, and thereby the danger of, arbi-
trary and unjustified searches.
The constitutional basis for limiting the power to arrest for
traffic offenses is clear. That such a limitation is the best solu-
tion to the danger created by Robinson is also clear. Prohibiting
indiscriminate decisions to arrest forestalls unjustified searches
and provides a clear rule that police officers can easily follow. It
requires no probing for evidence of motive. It does not place the
officer in danger. It recognizes both" 'that the Fourth Amend-
ment's commands, like all constitutional requirements, are
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practical and not abstract,' "356 and that" '[t]he basic purpose of
this Amendment ... is to safeguard the privacy and security of
individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental offi-
cials.' "357 Custodial arrest for a minor traffic offense is an in-
fringement on individual freedom that is prohibited by the
fourth amendment.
356. LaFave, supra note 17, at 163 (quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380
U.S. 102, 108 (1965».
357. Id. at 163 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528
(1967».
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